Locating the Source of Approach/Avoidance Effects on Natural Language Category Decisions by Zivot, Matthew
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Open Access Dissertations
9-2012
Locating the Source of Approach/Avoidance
Effects on Natural Language Category Decisions
Matthew Zivot
University of Massachusetts Amherst, mzivot@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations
Part of the Psychiatry and Psychology Commons
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Open Access Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Zivot, Matthew, "Locating the Source of Approach/Avoidance Effects on Natural Language Category Decisions" (2012). Open Access
Dissertations. 674.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations/674
LOCATING THE SOURCE OF APPROACH/AVOIDANCE EFFECTS ON
NATURAL LANGUAGE CATEGORY DECISIONS
A Dissertation Presented
by
MATTHEW ZIVOT
Submitted to the Graduate School of the 
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
September 2012
Psychology
© Copyright by Matthew Zivot 2012
All Rights Reserved
LOCATING THE SOURCE OF APPROACH/AVOIDANCE EFFECTS ON
NATURAL LANGUAGE CATEGORY DECISIONS
A Dissertation Presented
by
MATTHEW ZIVOT
Approved as to style and content by: 
_________________________________________________ 
Andrew Cohen, Chair
_________________________________________________ 
Charles Clifton, Jr., Member
_________________________________________________ 
Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Member
_________________________________________________ 
Angela De Oliveira, Member
  _____________________________________________ 
  Melinda Novak, Department Head
  Psychology
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
 I would like to thank my advisor, Andrew Cohen, for his insights, suggestions and 
willingness to go to bat for me. Thanks also to Chuck Clifton, who welcomed me into the 
program and helped me to think through the field.
 Thanks to Mindi Rock for selflessly sharing her data and to Lisa Fiorenzo for 
selflessly helping me collect my data.
 I am forever indebted to my wife, Emily Zivot. From helping organize these 
thoughts through helping me edit this manuscript, she supported me through this entire 
dissertation. Thank you for learning to distinguish an exemplar model from a prototype 
model just so you could help me.
 Finally, thanks and love to my parents. For years of unconditional support, all 
they wanted in return was to attend my defense.
vABSTRACT
LOCATING THE SOURCE OF APPROACH/AVOIDANCE EFFECTS ON
NATURAL LANGUAGE CATEGORY DECISIONS
SEPTEMBER 2012
MATTHEW ZIVOT, B.A., THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Andrew Cohen
 In this dissertation, two exemplar-based models of categorization, the General 
Context Model (GCM) and the Exemplar Based Random Walk model (EBRW), were 
used to describe between-group categorization differences in artificial and natural 
language categories. Prior research has shown that political Conservatives in avoidance 
mode are more exclusive categorizers of natural language category members than 
Conservatives in approach mode, but this effect was absent for Liberals (Rock & 
Janoff-Bulman, 2010). In Experiment 1, experimenter-generated stimuli were used to 
show that the EBRW could account for between-group differences in categorization 
decisions. In Experiment 2, the data collected by Rock and Janoff-Bulman were used 
to develop techniques allowing the GCM to account for between-group differences in 
natural language categorization decisions. Experiment 3 extends these methods to allow 
the EBRW to account for between-group differences in natural language categorization 
decisions. Across these experiments, the models identify between-group differences in 
determining similarity, bias to give an “in-the-category” decision, and the amount of 
information required to make a categorization decision. Techniques for modeling natural 
language categorization decisions are discussed
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1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
 Sometimes, the Supreme Court must step in to make a categorization decision 
for a nation torn apart. In 1893 it officially decided that tomatoes are Vegetables and not 
Fruit in Nix v. Hedden (1893). In the Court’s decision the common use of tomatoes—as 
an ingredient in salads and main dishes rather than desserts—is taken as evidence that 
tomatoes are Vegetables. This decision, however, has not ended the debate. Just recently 
Ohio named the tomato its State Fruit. The Supreme Court may have to revisit this issue 
in the near future.
 Why do these debates continue? What is different about people who categorize 
tomatoes as fruits and those who categorize them as vegetables? Researchers have 
identified many causes of between-group differences in categorization decisions, 
including goals (e.g., Barsalou, 1983), mood (e.g., Isen & Daubman, 1984), background 
knowledge (e.g., Lin & Murphy, 1997), and the interaction of political identity and being 
in approach or avoidance mode (Rock & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). Researchers are still 
uncertain, however, which step or steps in the categorization process are influenced by 
these contextual factors.
 This dissertation will use models of categorization to account for between-group 
differences in categorization observed by Rock and Janoff-Bulman. They found that 
when Conservative participants were placed into avoidance mode—a state in which 
people focus on preventing negative outcomes—they became more exclusive categorizers 
than when Conservative participants were placed into approach mode—a state in which 
people focus on bringing about positive outcomes. That is, Conservatives in avoidance 
mode required items to be highly typical of their category before they made an “In-the-
category” judgment. Liberals, however, were found to be equally inclusive regardless of 
whether they were in approach or avoidance mode.
2 In order to locate the source of between-group differences in categorization 
decisions, one must first identify the stages of categorization. For millennia, 
categorization was considered to be a rule-defined process in which people determined 
whether a to-be-categorized item met all the criteria set forth by the rules that govern 
a category (Murphy, 2002). For example, a tomato is a fruit if it has seeds within a 
fleshy covering. Theoretical work by Wittgenstein (1953) and empirical studies by 
Rosch and Mervis (1975) have provided evidence that categories are not rule-based but 
instead are family-resemblance based. For example, a tomato has uses in common with 
many vegetables and therefore should be grouped with the items to which it is most 
similar. According to this view, the process of categorization depends on determining 
the dimensions along which category members are similar and how this similarity is 
translated into category membership (Medin & Schaffer, 1978).
 Many theories of categorization focus on how the features of a to-be-categorized 
item impact a categorization decision (for a critique, see Murphy & Medin, 1985). 
As discussed, though, factors other than the item itself have been shown to influence 
category related decisions. For the purposes of this dissertation, these factors will be 
referred to as context.
 Researchers who have investigated components of the categorization process 
that are affected by context have focused on the selection of pertinent dimensions (e.g., 
Kelemen & Bloom, 1994; Lin & Murphy, 1997). (For example, attending to the color 
of a person’s clothing may be essential for categorizing friends versus foes during a 
pick-up basketball game but bears little weight while ice skating.) Researchers have 
specifically designed their experiments to identify differences in this component of 
categorization. While determining how attention is distributed across dimensions is an 
important component of the categorization process, it is neither the only component of 
the categorization process nor the only one in which context has an effect. For instance, 
researchers have found that approach and avoidance mode not only impacts how attention 
3is distributed across dimensions (Förster, Friedman, Özelsel, & Denzler, 2006; P. A. 
Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008), but also whether commonalities or differences are given 
preference for making similarity judgments (Förster, 2009) and how decision boundaries 
are established (Markman, Baldwin, & Maddox, 2005). If context can affect components 
of categorization other than the selection of pertinent dimensions, more sensitive 
experimental methods will be required to capture these effects.
 Process models of categorization like SUSTAIN (Love, Medin, & Gureckis, 
2004) and the General Context Model (Nosofsky, 1984; Nosofsky, 1986) represent 
multiple components of the categorization process. Such models can be used to identify 
any component in which context creates between-group categorization differences so 
long as the model has a parameter to describe that component. In order to describe 
between-group differences, a model must be selected that has parameters for components 
of categorization that are affected by context.
 Exemplar models, such as the General Context Model and the Exemplar Based 
Random Walk (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997), are good candidates for identifying the 
components of the categorization process that are affected by context. An exemplar-
based model represents a category with a set of previously seen items whose category 
membership is known (i.e., exemplars). In these models a to-be-categorized item is 
compared to exemplars and categorized based on the category membership of the 
exemplars to which it is most similar. A prototype-based model represents a category with 
an abstraction of previously seen items whose category membership is known (Hampton, 
1993). Exemplar-based models may be better able to describe the effects of ephemeral 
contexts than prototype-based or rule-based models because information about previously 
seen category members is preserved. Furthermore, exemplar models have parameters 
that can be matched with cognitive processes upon which approach and avoidance modes 
have an impact.
4 The purpose of this dissertation, therefore, is to determine whether the General 
Context Model and the Exemplar Based Random Walk can identify the source of 
between-group differences in categorization decisions reported by Rock and Janoff-
Bulman (2010). To do so requires:
 1. Using the EBRW to examine between-group differences in categorizing 
artificial stimuli;
 2. Extending the GCM to account for between-group differences in natural 
language categorization; and finally,
 3. Extending the EBRW to account for between-group differences in natural 
language categorization.
5CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Process of Categorization
 If a category can be defined with a set of necessary and sufficient rules, then 
categorization is a simple task. When an item fulfils those rules, it is a member of the 
category; when it does not, it is not. Socrates is looking for just such a set of rules on the 
way to his trial when he says, “I did not bid you to tell me one or two of the many pious 
actions, but the form itself that makes all pious actions pious” (Plato, 1975). Philosophers 
spent millennia trying to define necessary and sufficient rules for categories, but could 
only do so for the most artificial of categories like the mathematical category: prime 
numbers.
 In the middle of the twentieth century, Wittgenstein (1953) concluded that 
categories are not based on necessary and sufficient rules, but are based on family 
resemblance. He writes that family resemblances are “a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and crisscrossing.” For example, as a Dead Head you might 
listen to jam music, wear tie-dye, go on tour with a band, and sell plates of rice and beans 
in a parking lot, but you may not have to do all of these things to be a Dead Head.
 If categories are based on family resemblance, membership can be a continuous 
measure rather than an all-or-nothing state. Evidence for this continuum has come from 
different measurements. Rosch (1975) showed that different people tended to agree on 
how typical an item was of a given category. Rips, Shoben, and Smith (1973) showed 
that an item’s typicality as a member of a given category predicts the speed with which a 
person can make a categorization decision about that item. McCloskey and Glucksberg 
(1978) showed that an item’s typicality as a member of a given category predicts the & 
Blok, 2005) or average (Hampton, 1993) representations of categories. For example, the 
prototypical representation of Bird might have all of the features associated with birds, 
such as flying, having feathers, and living in trees. It also would lack all of the features 
6that are associated with other categories, such as swimming, having scales, or nesting on 
the ground. According to proponents of exemplars, a to-be-categorized item is compared 
to a set of previously seen items that represent a category (Medin & Schaffer, 1978). For 
example, an item seen moving across the sky might be compared to specific birds, planes, 
and super-heroes that you have previously seen.
The Effect of Context on Categorization
 Although category membership is on a continuum, there is no reason for category 
decisions to be inconsistent over time (McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978) unless the 
context within which a category decision is made matters. An ephemeral context like 
a temporary goal or stance may account for some of the intrapersonal variability in 
categorization decisions observed by McCloskey and Glucksberg. Barsalou (1983) 
showed that participants provided with a goal that two items—normally considered 
dissimilar—can both accomplish were more likely to rate those items as similar. For 
example, when participants were given the goal of getting a birthday gift, they rated CDs 
and necklaces as more similar than participants who were not given a goal. Lombrozo 
(2009) showed that participants primed to take a teleological stance (focusing on ends) 
were more likely to say that items were members of a given category if those items had 
the same parts as known category members. Participants primed to take a mechanistic 
stance (focusing on means) were more likely to say that items were members of a given 
category if those items behaved in the same way as known category members. For 
example, a teleological stance might make you more likely to accept a person wearing 
a suit who listens to the Grateful Dead as a Dead Head, but a mechanistic stance might 
favor you towards a person wearing tie-die who does not listen to the Grateful Dead.
 An ephemeral context like a temporary mood or mode may account for 
intrapersonal variability in categorization decisions. Ell, Cosley, and McCoy (2011) 
showed that participants under stress were able to identify members of a learned category 
more accurately than participants who were not under stress. Isen and Daubman (1984) 
7showed that participants who were given a free gift or shown a funny movie were more 
willing to include atypical category members in a given category (e.g., olives in Fruit) 
than those who did not receive a free gift or who saw a boring movie. Using a similar 
categorization task, Price and Harmon-Jones (2010) showed that mode (approach 
vs. avoidance) may alter the inclusiveness of categorizers who are in a good mood. 
Participants were asked to smile, emulating a positive mood, and then to lean forward, sit 
upright, or recline, representing a range from high to low approach mode. Participants in 
the low-approach mode position (i.e., recliners) were more inclusive when categorizing 
atypical items than participants in the high-approach mode position (i.e., leaners).
 Context like accessories that are incidental to a to-be-categorized item—ephemera 
that could change while the to-be-categorized item itself does not—may account for some 
of the intrapersonal variability in categorization decisions. Macrae, Bodenhausen, and 
Milne (1995) showed that participants shown a video of an Asian woman eating with 
chopsticks were more likely to categorize her as Asian while participants shown video of 
the same woman applying make-up were more likely to categorize her as a Woman.
 Finally, categories can be imagined as fitting into a taxonomy, with more abstract 
superordinate labels and less abstract subordinate labels. For instance, a sparrow is a 
Bird, which is an Animal. Ephemeral contexts may account for some of the intrapersonal 
variability in categorization decisions by changing the way that people use this taxonomy 
when categorizing. Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and Boyes-Braem (1976) and Collins 
and Quillian (1969) showed that categories often display what is termed a “basic 
level effect.” Participants in both studies displayed a preference for a certain level of 
abstractness when categorizing. For example, an item was categorized as a Chair first 
and faster than as Furniture (superordinate) or as an Easy Chair (subordinate). Ephemeral 
context like the scene that surrounds a to-be-categorized item can diminish or erase 
the basic level effect (Murphy & Wisniewski, 1989). For example, an object might be 
categorized as a Settee when it is selected from a showroom but may be categorized as a 
8Couch when it is offered as a seat to a friend. In part, this is due to the other objects from 
which the to-be-categorized item needs to be distinguished.
 Rosch (1975) showed that when participants were primed with a superordinate 
category label, they read words representing typical members of that category faster and 
words representing atypical members of that category slower than when they were not 
primed with a superordinate category label. Temporarily changing the context in which 
a superordinate category label is seen changes the facility with which participants read 
words representing typical and atypical members of that category (Roth & Shoben, 
1983). For example, the word “goat” was read faster than the word “horse” following a 
sentence about “milking the animal” even though horses are more typical members of the 
category Animal than goats.
 Some contexts, like background knowledge, are more persistent and may account 
for interpersonal differences in categorization decisions. Tanaka and Taylor (1991) 
showed that the extent of background knowledge participants had about an item changed 
the basic taxonomic level at which that item was categorized. Experts identified items at a 
more subordinate basic level than novices. For example, a bird expert who spots a scarlet 
tanager is likely to categorize it as a Tanager, while a non-birder is likely to categorize it 
as a Bird1. Yamauchi and Yu (2008) showed that adding background knowledge changed 
the types of inferences participants made about the members of a category. When 
participants were told that an item’s label reflected category membership they inferred 
that the item shared features of prototypical category members. When they were told that 
an item’s label reflected the place where it lived or the type of food it ate they inferred 
that the item shared features of the most similar exemplar that they had seen.
 Persistent contexts like group identity may also affect categorization decisions. 
Medin, Cox, and Ross (2006) showed that sport and subsistence fishermen in the same 
region rate the typicality of local fishes differently even though both groups were highly 
1 Note: This is taxonomically equivalent to categorizing squirrels, dogs, and humans as 
Mammals, so perhaps—not surprisingly—we are all mammal experts.
9familiar with these fish. Lynch, Coley, and Medin (2000) showed that tree taxonomists 
and horticulturalists both used goals for determining tree typicality, but differences in 
their goals led them to rate the typicality of trees differently. Ratneshwar, Barsalou, 
Pechmann, and Moore (2001) showed that participants identified as healthy eaters and 
participants who were not identified as healthy eaters rated the similarity of candy bars 
and granola bars differently when they were asked to consider foods one might eat while 
driving. Lombrozo (2009) showed that participants who naturally take a teleological 
stance toward the world were likely to include items with similar purposes in the same 
category, while participants who naturally take a mechanistic stance toward the world 
were more likely to include items with similar constructions in the same category. Rock 
and Janoff-Bulman (2010) showed that participants who self-identified as politically 
conservative were more likely to exclude items of moderate typicality from a given 
category when those participants were put in avoidance mode. For example, they were 
less likely to say that a bookcase is Furniture or that a yacht is a Vehicle. Participants 
who self-identified as political liberals were not more likely to exclude items of moderate 
typicality from a given category when those participants were put in avoidance mode.
 Finally, persistent context like the relationships between category members can 
affect categorization decisions. Categories can be more or less coherent based on how 
well they “go together in light of prior theoretical, causal, and teleological knowledge” 
(Patalano, Chin-Parker, & Ross, 2006). Patalano, Wengrovitz, and Sharpes (2009) and 
Patalano, Chin-Parker, and Ross (2006) showed that people are more likely to make 
inferences based on an item’s membership in a more coherent category than that item’s 
membership in a less coherent category. Participants were more likely to make inferences 
about feminist waiters based on their membership in the category Feminists than in their 
membership in the category Waiters.
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Identifying the Effect of Context on Attention to Dimensions
 Experimenters that attempt to identify specific components of the categorization 
process that are affected by context often use artificial stimuli or artificial categories. 
These stimuli have high internal validity (but low ecological validity) because 
experimenters create them to operationalize the specific theories about categorization 
that they are investigating. For example, Yamauchi and Yu (2008) created “bug” stimuli 
with five different dimensions (antennae shape, head shape, number of legs, thorax 
markings, tail shape), each of which had two feature values. The category label assigned 
to each variation of these stimuli was determined based on family resemblance theories 
of category structure. These clearly delineated dimensions with easily distinguishable 
features are designed allow researchers to identify how these dimensions are used for the 
purpose of categorization.
 For example, Kelemen and Bloom (1994) designed stimuli that were circles of 
different colors and sizes. When participants were told that they were categorizing Tiny 
Machines they categorized primarily along the dimension of size; when participants 
were told that they were categorizing Microscopic Animals they categorized primarily 
along the dimension of color. Background knowledge about Animals and Machines is 
likely to have changed the dimensions that participants used when making categorization 
decisions.
 A series of studies using the novel categories of Arctic Vehicles and Jungle 
Vehicles have shown that background knowledge affects the selection of pertinent 
dimensions during categorization decisions (Kaplan & Murphy, 1999; Kaplan & Murphy, 
2000; Murphy & Allopenna, 1994; Spalding & Murphy, 1999). When making decisions 
about novel categories, background knowledge made it easier for participants to build 
multi-dimensional family resemblance categories rather than one-dimensional rule-
based categories (Kaplan & Murphy, 1999). It also made it easier for participants to 
learn categories that require attention across multiple dimensions (Kaplan & Murphy, 
11
2000; Murphy & Allopenna, 1994) without reducing their sensitivity to feature frequency 
(Spalding & Murphy, 1999). In all of these studies, participants used more of the 
dimensions of the vehicles for their categorization decisions than when the dimensions 
did not allow them to apply their background knowledge.
 Sometimes researchers create both artificial stimuli and artificial categories to 
pinpoint a step in the categorization process that they think context affects. For example, 
Lin and Murphy (1997) created an artificial category Tuk and artificial stimuli with four 
dimensions (a loop, a cone, a tube, and a string), each of which could have a value of 
present or absent. One group of participants learned that a Tuk was an animal catching 
device; a second group of participants learned that a Tuk was a pesticide spreading 
device. Participants with different background knowledge paid attention to different 
dimensions when making categorization decisions about which artificial stimuli were in 
the artificial category Tuk and which were not.
Effects of Approach/Avoidance Mode on Cognition
 The purpose of this dissertation is to account for the between-group differences 
in categorization decisions identified by Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010). Namely, that 
Conservatives were more likely to exclude items of moderate typicality from a given 
category when they were put in avoidance mode. Research on approach and avoidance 
modes and cognition indicate several potential sources of this effect: spreading attention 
(Friedman & Förster, 2005; Förster et al., 2006; P. A. Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008; P. 
Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010; Koch, Holland, Hengstler, & van Knippenberg, 2009), 
attention to similarities as opposed to dissimilarities (Förster, 2009), and changing 
decision criteria (Markman et al., 2005). In each of the studies discussed in the previous 
section, researchers have investigated the effect of context on one component of the 
categorization process: the selection of pertinent dimensions. The current section will 
show that accounting for the between-group differences in categorization by people 
12
in approach and avoidance mode will require a method sensitive to differences in 
components other than the selection of pertinent dimensions.
 Approach and avoidance mode may impact the spread of attention though the 
direction of its effect is unclear. Participants have a narrow spread of attention when 
they focus on component elements (i.e., the trees); they have a broad spread of attention 
when they focus on composite elements (i.e., the forest). Förster et al. (2006) primed 
participants for approach or avoidance and then had them respond to composite letters 
that were comprised of smaller component letters (called Navon letters). They found that 
participants in the approach condition were faster to respond to the composite letters and 
participants in the avoidance condition were faster to respond to the component letters. 
This indicates that participants in the approach condition were spreading their attention 
more broadly to see the larger picture and participants in the avoidance condition were 
narrowing their attention to see the details.
 Approach and avoidance mode may interact with emotion to affect the spread of 
attention. In a study of mode and positive affect (P. A. Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008), 
participants were primed for either low-approach mode or high approach mode and then 
asked to choose the best pair from a group that matched either on composite shape or 
component parts. Gable and Harmon-Jones found that participants in the low approach 
condition selected shapes with composite similarity more often than participants in the 
high-approach condition. In a similar study, Gable and Harmon-Jones (2010) primed 
participants with low levels of avoidance or high levels of avoidance and asked them to 
respond to Navon letters. They found that participants in the low avoidance condition 
were faster to identify composite letters than component letters, while participants in the 
high avoidance condition were faster to identify component letters than composite letters. 
In contrast to the findings of Förster et al. (2006), these studies indicate that both high 
avoidance and high approach modes lead to a narrower distribution of attention relative 
to low avoidance or low approach modes.
13
 The Stroop task is another measure that approach and avoidance modes impact, 
and again the direction of that impact is unclear. Friedman and Förster (2005) found 
that participants primed with approach mode were faster to respond to incompatible 
color trials than participants primed with avoidance mode. In a contrasting study using 
embodied cognition techniques, Koch, Holland, Hengstler and van Knippenberg (2009) 
found that when participants were primed with avoidance mode, they were faster on the 
incompatible color trials than when they were primed with approach mode. Not only do 
these results contradict each other, but the authors’ interpretation of them may conflict 
as well. Koch et al. take their results as evidence that, “avoidance cues facilitate the 
recruitment of cognitive control.” Friedman and Förster, however, take their results to 
mean that approach mode serves to, “enhance attentional flexibility.”
 In the end, what is being “cognitively controlled” is which cues to attend to and 
which to ignore, so all of these studies imply that approach and avoidance modes impact 
the distribution of attention. This explanation holds regardless of whether approach mode 
broadens attention, avoidance mode broadens attention, or they both decrease it. The 
effect still lies at the distribution of attention. Therefore, any method used to identify 
between-group differences in categorization performance due to approach and avoidance 
mode should have a way of measuring the distribution of attention.
 Recent research has reinterpreted the meaning of the broad versus narrow 
spreading of attention as attending to similarities as opposed to dissimilarities. Förster 
(2009) found that, when asked to compare two items, participants who were primed with 
broad attention listed more similarities than dissimilarities while participants primed with 
narrow attention listed more dissimilarities than similarities. This implies that approach 
and avoidance modes change the way that people weight similarity, either focusing 
participants on what makes items more similar to each other or more dissimilar to each 
other. Therefore, any method used to identify the source of the differences between 
modes should be able to account for differences in similarity weighting.
14
 Research on the interaction between approach and avoidance mode and category 
structure during a category learning task indicates that mode can influence a decision 
criterion Markman, Baldwin and Maddox (Markman et al., 2005) found that when 
participants primed with approach mode learned a one-dimensional category with an 
approach feedback structure, they used a categorization criterion that optimized reward 
rather than performance. Participants primed with approach mode learning a one-
dimensional category with an avoidance feedback structure used a criterion to optimize 
performance rather than reward. Conversely, participants primed with avoidance mode 
used a criterion to optimize reward with an avoidance feedback structure but optimized 
performance with an approach feedback structure. In this one-dimensional category 
structure, spread of attention across dimensions could not be a factor. This finding implies 
that a method used to identify between-group differences due to approach and avoidance 
modes should be able to identify changes in decision boundary as well.
 Finally, Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010) found that conservatives in avoidance 
mode were less likely to include moderately typical items in a category, while Price 
and Harmon-Jones (2010) found that participants in avoidance were more likely to 
include highly atypical items in a category. This difference in results may be explained 
by changes in consistency of categorization decisions. If avoidance mode induces 
probability matching, categorizers in avoidance mode would make “in-the-category” 
decisions in proportion to their perceived probability that the to-be-categorized item is a 
category member, as opposed to consistently giving the most likely response. Practically 
speaking, this behavior would increase the inclusion of moderately atypical items while 
depressing the inclusion of moderately typical items. Any method used to identify the 
source of approach/avoidance differences on categorization should include a way to 
measure the consistency of responding. Research by Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh and Baldacci 
(2008) indicates that political conservatism tend toward avoidance mode while political 
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liberalism tend toward approach mode, so a method that can capture the effects of 
approach/avoidance should be able to capture the effects of political identity as well.
Modeling the Categorization Process
 The previous section shows that approach and avoidance modes affect the 
spread of attention across dimensions, whether commonalities or dissimilarities are 
attended to and how decision criteria are established. It is clear that a method for 
locating the components in the categorization process affected by approach/avoidance 
will need to capture effects other than how attention is distributed across dimensions. A 
promising method for identifying the effects of approach/avoidance is to use models of 
categorization. Process models formalize the components of the categorization process, 
specifying parameters that describe each component (Kruschke, 2008). Differences 
in these parameters can reflect between-group differences in specific components of 
categorization.
 When formalizing the categorization process, models make assumptions about 
whether categories are represented with prototypes or exemplars. They also break up 
the categorization process into different components. The assumptions that a model 
makes about the process of categorization affects its ability to capture the between-group 
differences caused by approach and avoidance mode. Some models of categorization, 
such as ATRIUM (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998) and ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992) have 
been shown to perform well at capturing categorization decisions. Since they are 
implemented as connectionist models that slowly learn categories over time, however, 
they are not well suited to capturing the spontaneous changes in categorization behavior 
observed in Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010). Other models, such as the Rational 
Model (Anderson, 1991) use a Bayesian analysis to describe optimal categorization 
performance. This would not be well suited to indentifying the reason for between-group 
differences, since there can be only one optimal categorization strategy. This section 
will survey some of the prominent models of categorization that either explicitly address 
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between-group differences or have been designed in a way to capture the impacts of 
approach and avoidance mode.
Knowledge Resonance
 The Knowledge Resonance Model is a connectionist prototype model that has 
the effect of background knowledge built in (Rehder & Murphy, 2003). It represents a 
to-be-categorized item’s features as input nodes and category labels as output nodes. 
For example, a connectionist model of Dead Head categorization could have an input 
node for tie-die shirts. When this input node is activated in the presence of a tie-die shirt, 
it excites the output node of Dead Head. The Knowledge Resonance Model (KRES) 
is constructed to represent the kind of association between features that background 
knowledge brings to the categorization process (e.g., Hoffman, Harris, & Murphy, 2008; 
Murphy & Allopenna, 1994). For example, knowing that a person wears tie-die magnifies 
the effect of knowing that they tour with a band when exciting the Dead Head category 
label. Furthermore, it mutes the potential activation of contrasting features that could 
inhibit the activation of the Dead Head category label, such as living in a Manhattan 
penthouse. KRES represents these relations with excitatory connections between features 
that are associated with each other and inhibitory connections between features that 
associated with a contrasting category.
 KRES is unsatisfactory for capturing the effects of approach and avoidance on 
categorization because the effects of context are built into the model. KRES represents 
between-group differences as the excitatory and inhibitory associations between features. 
These relations are not flexible and cannot reflect the ephemeral changes that occur when 
a person changes goals, moods or modes. Furthermore, KRES does not break down 
categorization in a way that provides analogs with the aspects of cognition that approach 
and avoidance mode have been shown to impact, such as attending to similarities versus 
dissimilarities and changing decision boundaries. All effects are all conflated in the 
weights between nodes.
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Baywatch
 A second model that captures the effect of background knowledge is called 
Baywatch (Heit, Briggs, & Bott, 2004). It is also a connectionist prototype model in 
which input feature nodes get associated with output category labels. The model is 
modified so that features also can get associated with latent concepts, which themselves 
get associated with category labels. For instance, if you did not know the concept of 
Parrot Heads, you would be unlikely to apply that category label to people wearing 
flip-flops, drinking margaritas and following Jimmy Buffet. Once you realize that Parrot 
Heads are similar in concept to Dead Heads, wearing flip-flops and drinking margaritas 
gets associated with concept of Dead Head. The latent concept of Dead Head then gets 
associated with the category label Parrot Head, providing extra activation between Parrot 
Head input nodes and the Parrot Head category label.
 While Baywatch may partially represent the impact that background knowledge 
has on categorization decisions, it cannot be extended to account for the effects of 
ephemeral context observed by Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010). Like KRES, the effect 
of background knowledge is built into the model. In Baywatch this effect is included as 
the presence of latent concepts, preventing this model from capturing ephemeral context 
effects on categorization. Also like KRES, all effects in Baywatch are captured in the 
weights between input nodes, latent concepts, and output nodes. This makes Baywatch 
unable to identify components of the categorization process that are affected by approach/
avoidance mode.
General Recognition Theory
 General Recognition Theory is a modern version of rule-based categorization 
theories (Ashby & Maddox, 1993; Maddox & Ashby, 1993). For instance, imagine a 
group of Dead Heads arguing about how to determine category membership. One is 
only willing to include people who have seen a minimum number of shows. Another 
is only willing to include people who have accumulated a minimum number of taped 
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concerts. A third allows a more generous combination of the two – if you have seen 
some shows and possess some taped concerts, you are categorized as a Dead Head. The 
General Recognition Theory (GRT) represents the categorization process by fitting a 
decision boundary that separates 
members of different categories. 
For the first categorizer, it will 
locate a linear boundary along 
the “shows-attended” dimension, 
for the second categorizer it will 
locate a linear boundary along the 
“taped-concerts” dimension, and for 
the third categorizer it will find a 
combination of both dimensions that 
best accounts for their categorization 
decisions. Figure 1 shows a 
graphical representation of these 
boundaries.
 The GRT does a good job of capturing the spread of attention across dimensions. 
It could capture the effects of approach and avoidance observed by Forster et al. (2006) 
and Gable and Harmon-Jones (2008). Narrowed attention could be represented by a 
one-dimensional rule while broad attention could be represented by a combination 
across multiple dimensions. The GRT, however, would not be able to capture potential 
differences in whether commonalities or dissimilarities are given preference since it has 
no way of describing dimensions in this fashion. The GRT also has no way to determine 
if categorization decisions have become more or less consistent, since there are no 
regions of uncertainty around the decision boundary. It predicts that every item on a given 
side of the boundary will be included or excluded with equal probability.
Figure 1: Example of GRT category boundaries
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 The GRT has been used to identify between-group differences in categorization. 
Ell et al. (2011) had participants learn to categorize a two-dimensional stimulus in a 
way that required attending to both dimensions after they had been placed in a stressful 
situation. The researchers used the GRT to determine that a participant’s perception of 
threat was associated with their using an appropriate strategy of combining information 
across dimensions (rather than attending to only one dimension or just guessing). Again, 
the GRT does not test for any differences other than attention to dimensions, and any 
other potential differences in the categorization process were undetected.
SUSTAIN
 SUSTAIN is a connectionist prototype model that accounts for both how new 
items are categorized and how new categories are learned (Love et al., 2004). Instead 
of a typical prototype model with just one prototype for each category (Hampton, 
1993), categories in SUSTAIN are represented by a set of prototypes called subgroups. 
Subgroups are averages across a subset of previously seen category members, and these 
subgroups help to represent categories in which there are disparate clusters of entities. 
For example, spoons are usually either small and metal or large and wooden, but not 
somewhere in between the two. A prototype model with just one representation of spoons 
would have trouble representing this structure, so in SUSTAIN spoons might be best 
represented by two clusters. One averages the features of previously seen teaspoons and 
soupspoons, and another averages the features of previously seen wooden spoons.
 In the categorization process as described by SUSTAIN the similarity between 
a to-be-categorized item a subgroups determines the activation of that subgroup. 
The subgroup with the most activation determines the outcome of the categorization 
decision. In SUSTAIN and other similarity-based models of categorization, similarity is 
a mathematical measure of how close the features of a to-be-categorized item are to those 
of a given category representation (be it an exemplar or a prototype). For SUSTAIN, 
similarity is determined by degree of match between the to-be-categorized item and the 
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subgroup’s typical feature values, weighted by how important each dimension is for the 
purposes of categorization. When a dimension is unimportant for identifying a subgroup, 
any feature value along that dimension adds a little bit to the similarity calculation. For 
example, the color of a spoon bears little importance to the small spoon cluster, and 
therefore an item of any color will provide a little bit of activation. For a dimension 
that is important to category membership, a feature that is located in the correct part 
of the dimension space adds a lot to the similarity calculation, while a feature located 
in the wrong part of the dimension space does not add anything at all. For example, 
having a bowl at its top would provide a lot of activation to both spoon clusters. If a 
to-be-categorized item is sufficiently similar to one subgroup, it is assumed to have the 
category membership of that group and the item’s features are averaged into the subgroup 
representation. If it is not sufficiently similar to any subgroup, a new subgroup gets 
created with the new item’s features and category membership.
 Like the connectionist prototype models previously discussed, SUSTAIN would 
have problems accounting for the effects of approach and avoidance on categorization 
observed by Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010). First, SUSTAIN would have a hard 
time accounting for an ephemeral change in dimension saliency since SUSTAIN is a 
connectionist model that learns the importance of a given dimension over time and there 
is no mechanism for those values to shift suddenly. This is especially problematic since 
all context effects that have so far been located within the categorization process have 
been identified as occurring at the level changing attention to dimensions. Second, it does 
not have a process for accounting for how similarities or dissimilarities are preferred. 
Finally, the process of averaging across items to create subgroups obscures the individual 
information of each previously seen item. If attending to similarities suddenly makes a 
specific exemplar salient and this impacts categorization decisions, SUSTAIN could only 
handle this if it preserved that specific exemplar within its own subgroup. For instance, 
imagine being asked if a honey-dipper was a spoon. It is unlike the average representation 
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for small spoons, but it may be moderately similar to a previously seen hand-carved 
wooden spoon. A categorizer attending to commonalities would likely call this spoon 
to mind while a categorizer attending to dissimilarities would not. SUSTAIN would be 
unlikely to capture this difference.
GCM
 As described in the introduction, the GCM is an exemplar-based model of 
category application (Ashby & Maddox, 1993; Nosofsky, 1984; Nosofsky, 1986). To 
categorize an item, the GCM calculates that items similarity to all previously seen 
exemplars. The GCM predicts that the item has the probability of being placed in a given 
category relative its similarity is to exemplars of that category. The GCM has a few 
aspects that make it attractive for identifying the between-group differences observed by 
Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010): it explicitly weights the impact of each dimension of a 
given item on the similarity calculation, and it has a parameter that scales the impact of 
moderately similar items.
 The GCM has a weight for each dimension that is factored into the categorization 
decision. These dimension weights allow a dimension to have more weight in certain 
circumstances and less in others. To return to our feuding Dead Heads example, 
Categorizer 1 would put all weight on the “shows attended” dimension, Categorizer 2 
would put all weight on the “concerts taped” dimension and Categorizer 3 would split 
weight between both dimensions. Note that these weights are not an inherent property 
of the exemplars but instead they filter the exemplar at the time of the categorization 
decision. That is, the dimensions of an exemplar that are important for its category 
membership are not fixed. This means that, unlike SUSTAIN, the GCM can account for 
the effects of ephemeral contexts like approach and avoidance on the spread of attention 
across dimensions (Förster et al., 2006; P. A. Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008). A person 
could have attended many Grateful Dead concerts and therefore be similar to other Dead 
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Heads for Categorizer 1 and also have many concerts on tape and therefore be similar to 
other Dead Heads for Categorizer 2.
 In addition to dimension weights, the GCM has a similarity scaling parameter 
that converts the distance between a to-be-categorized item and an exemplar to similarity. 
Similarity decreases exponentially as the distance between that exemplar and that to-be-
categorized item increases, and the scaling parameter controls the rate of that decrease. 
The larger this parameter is, the closer an exemplar needs to be to the to-be-categorized 
item before it influences the categorization decision. As will be shown, the distance 
metric in the GCM moves an exemplar farther from a to-be-categorized item when they 
have non-identical feature values along one dimension but does not move them closer 
together when they have identical feature values along a different dimension. This 
means that the similarity scaling parameter scales the effect of dissimilarities on the 
categorization decision and makes it able to identify the kinds of differences in attention 
to similarities versus dissimilarities that Forster (2009) identified.
 Finally, there is a response scaling parameter that relates certainty in category 
membership to consistency of categorization response (Ashby & Maddox, 1993). If this 
value of this parameter is low and people are uncertain about a category membership, 
their categorization decisions will vacillate. Some days they will say, “yes, the tie-die 
wearing penthouse dweller is a Dead Head,” and some days they will say “no.” If the 
value of this parameter is high, and a person is uncertain about category membership, he 
or she will consistently give whatever answer is most probable.
 The GCM has a few drawbacks for identifying the source of context differences. 
First, the GCM assumes that a to-be-categorized item gets compared to all known 
exemplars. Depending on how “exemplar” is interpreted, this could mean all memories 
for every object ever seen. A person simply could not compare an item to all known 
exemplars when trying to place that item into a natural language category with many 
members that have each been seen many times. Second, there is debate as to how the 
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response scaling parameter relates to the categorization process (e.g., Navarro, 2007; 
Smith & Minda, 2002). While so far it has been discussed as if it relates sum similarity to 
categorization decisions, it could also be interpreted as directly impacting how similarity 
is calculated or how exemplars are sampled for the sake of comparison.
 The GCM (in different incarnations) has been applied to between-group 
differences in categorization at least twice. A between-group parameter difference in 
the GCM was used as evidence against a claim of multiple memory systems, one that 
is damaged in amnesiacs and one that is intact (Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998). This claim 
stemmed from the finding that amnesiacs performed at chance on a recognition memory 
task but performed significantly better at a categorization task that used the same stimuli. 
A modified version of the GCM was used to predict the categorization performance of 
amnesiac and normal participants by allowing the similarity scaling parameter to vary 
between groups. The model did a good job of accounting for between-group differences 
in categorization when the amnesiac group was given a small similarity scaling 
parameter, indicating that they were unable to differentiate between similar exemplars 
in memory. This difference might not impair categorization performance much since 
category members look more alike than non-category members, but could greatly impair 
recognition memory.
 Additionally, the GCM was used to show the source of between-group differences 
for participants placed into a happy or sad mood using a traditional, family resemblance 
set of categorization stimuli (Zivot, Cohen, & Kapucu, 2012). Zivot, Cohen, and Kapucu 
fit the GCM to each participant’s categorization decisions, and found that participants in 
a happy mood were more likely than participants in a sad mood to spread their attention 
across multiple dimensions. Happy participants, however, were not as successful as 
sad participants in identifying the dimensions that allowed them to most effectively 
distinguish the two categories from each other.
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EBRW
 The EBRW is the final model considered. It is a random-walk model with an 
underlying architecture based on the GCM without the response scaling parameter 
(Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997). In a random walk model of a categorization decision, 
information accumulates over time. When a sufficient amount of information is accrued, 
a decision is made. In the EBRW considered here, “in the category” and “out of the 
category” represent decisions. Information is accrued in the model by selecting an 
exemplar and incrementing the category decision a step in the direction of an “in the 
category” or an “out of the category” decision. The probability that a given exemplar is 
selected is determined by its similarity to the to-be-categorized item.
 For illustration, a mock process of deciding if a honey-dipper is a Spoon is given 
in Figure 2. At the start of the process, the categorizer has zero knowledge. First, a spoon 
exemplar gets brought to mind, incrementing the decision process one step towards the 
“in the category” boundary. Next, a fork exemplar is sampled, incrementing the decision 
Figure 2: Example of the random walk process in the EBRW
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process one step towards the “out of the category” boundary. Finally, two more spoons 
are sampled and the “In the category” boundary is reached. At this point, the model 
predicts that the categorizer makes an “in the category” decision in favor of a honey 
dipper being a Spoon.
 The EBRW shares dimension weighting and similarity scaling parameters with the 
GCM. Instead of a parameter representing consistency of response, it has two parameters 
representing the locations of the “In-the-category” and the “Out-of-the-category” 
boundaries. When both are far from the zero information point, responses will be highly 
consistent and when both are close to the zero information point, responses will be highly 
inconsistent. When one boundary is closer than the other to the zero information point, 
there will be a bias for giving that response relative to the other.
 The EBRW addresses some of the issues in using the GCM for modeling 
the impact of context on categorization decisions. First, it does not represent the 
categorization decision as comparing a to-be-categorized item to all known exemplars. 
Instead, the to-be-categorized item is compared to only enough exemplars for a 
categorization decision to be made. The model calculates the probability that a given 
exemplar will be influential in the categorization decision, which can be an interesting 
source of between-group differences in-and-of itself. Second, the EBRW’s boundary 
parameters allow it to account for an inclusivity or exclusivity bias that is directly built 
into the categorization process. If participants exhibit an overall bias to put items in a 
category (or exclude items from a category) it can be directly observed as a change in the 
boundary parameters.
 The added complexity provided by the EBRW comes at a price: the model 
requires additional data. In order to determine category boundaries (that is, how much 
information is required for each categorization decision) the EBRW models response 
times (RT) as well as categorization decisions. This places methodological constraints on 
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using the EBRW and means that it cannot be used to model categorization data collected 
without concurrent RT.
Modeling Natural Language Categorization
 In order to identify the between-group differences observed by Rock and 
Janoff-Bulman (2010), any model selected will have to be able to account for natural 
language categorization decisions. While a few attempts have been made to model 
context effects on categorization with artificial stimuli, this has not been done for natural 
language categories. In fact, to date, there have been only a handful of the attempts of 
applying models of categorization decisions to natural language categories (Verbeemen, 
Vanpaemel, Pattyn, Storms, & Verguts, 2007; Verheyen, Hampton, & Storms, 2010; 
Voorspoels et al., 2008) plus one attempt at modeling fruit and vegetable categorization 
decisions (Smits, Storms, Rosseel, & De Boeck, 2002).
 Applying similarity-based models of categorization to natural language categories 
requires that two major hurdles be overcome. First, similarity-based models require 
a similarity space that relates items to each other. Second, exemplar-based models 
require a set of items of known category membership to populate their exemplar space. 
Researchers have dealt with the similarity problem either by generating a feature 
applicability matrix (Smits et al., 2002; Verbeemen et al., 2007) or by using participants’ 
similarity judgments (Voorspoels et al., 2008). A feature applicability matrix is created 
by having one group of participants generate a list of potential features that category 
members could have and then having a second group determine if each feature is 
applicable to each potential category member. The resulting matrix is subjected to 
multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) as a data-reduction technique to generate a tractable 
set of dimensions. As an example of MDS, imagine every city in the United States 
was represented by a matrix of distances from every other city. MDS would convert 
these distances into the set of coordinates for each city that best preserves the distance 
relationship between cities. For items of known category membership, researchers 
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assumed that item familiarity was equivalent to category knowledge, and either used 
familiar items to predict the categorization judgments of unfamiliar items (Smits et 
al., 2002; Verbeemen et al., 2007) or just used typicality judgments within a category 
as a dependent measure and assumed that fuzzy category membership would not be 
problematic (Voorspoels et al., 2008).
 A few concerns regarding these methods will be mentioned now and more fully 
addressed in the Method section of modeling Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010) data. 
First, feature listing causes both theoretical and practical problems. People have been 
shown to list different features based on context (Wu & Barsalou, 2009), and feature lists 
are a binary judgment (i.e., present vs. absent) whereas many features are continuous 
or fuzzy. Methods for determining category membership for the purposes of modeling 
categorization decisions are also a cause for concern. Category membership determined 
a priori by the experimenters depends upon the experimenter’s judgment for the answer 
to the very question being asked of participants in the experiment (Smits et al., 2002; 
Verbeemen et al., 2007). If questions of category membership were clear, there would not 
be fuzzy categories or court cases about the category membership of tomatoes. Attempts 
to circumvent the problem by just looking at typicality as measured by within-category 
similarity (Voorspoels et al., 2008) are also problematic because they ignore evidence 
that typicality is related to both increased similarity to In-the-category members and 
decreased similarity to “out of the category” members (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Verheyen, 
De Deyne, Dry, & Storms, 2011).
 In spite of these concerns, the studies of natural language categorization cited 
above have been a good first step, showing promising methods and addressing issues 
of concern to categorization as a field. As a proof-of-concept, Smits et al. (2002) 
showed that models of categorization decisions can be applied to categories learned 
outside the laboratory and that people’s knowledge of category members are good 
predictors of their categorization behavior when encountering an unknown item. Both 
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Smits et al. and Voorspoels et al. (2008) tested whether an exemplar model (the GCM) 
or prototype model provided a better fit of categorization responses and found that 
the GCM accounted for categorization decisions better. Verbeemen et al. (2007) used 
natural language categories to test the Varying Abstraction Framework (Vanpaemel 
& Storms, 2008), a subgrouping model of categories that exists as an intermediary 
between prototype and exemplar theories. Previous findings in favor of a subgrouped 
representation are strengthened by their success modeling real-world items. In an 
ideal world, however, these subgroups would be intuitively sensible (e.g., there is no 
identifiable reason why nectarines, oranges, tangerines, plums, and cherries and all placed 
into a single group).
The GCM Defined
 As discussed above, the GCM is promising model for accounting for the between-
group differences observed by Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010). First, the parameters 
of the GCM capture a number of the components of categorization that prior research 
has shown can be affected by approach and avoidance mode. Second, the GCM has 
been previously been used to model natural language categories. This makes it a good 
starting point for identifying the stage in categorization where avoidance mode affects 
Conservatives’ categorization decisions (Rock & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). For the purposes 
of this dissertation, the GCM will be used to model between-group differences when RT 
is not available. This section will outline the formal properties of the model.
 Formally defined, the first step in the categorization process according to the 
GCM is to calculate the distance between the to-be-categorized item and all exemplars 
within a similarity space. The formula for calculating the distance d between to-be-
categorized item i and exemplar j is,
  
	  
 (1)
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where m is the dimension being evaluated, w
m
 is the weight placed on that dimension, and 
x
jm
 is the value of exemplar j along dimension m. In this model, all dimension weights 
must be greater than or equal to zero, and must sum to one. These dimension weights 
allow one dimension to be favored over another for the purposes of categorization. If, for 
some reason, tie-color was important for telling Republicans from Democrats but shoe 
color was not, weight would be placed on the tie dimension (w
tie
 = 1) but not on the shoe 
dimension (w
shoe
 = 0) .
 The next step in the categorization process is to convert distance to similarity (η). 
The η
ij
 between to-be-categorized item i and exemplar j is determined by the exponential 
decay function defined by Shepard,
  
	  
 (2)
where c is the similarity scaling parameter. With a high c value, only the only exemplars 
considered similar to the item are the ones that are very close in similarity space.
 The probability of an “In-the-category judgment” (p
i
) can be found by taking its 
similarity to exemplars in category A (S
iA
),
  
	  
 (3)
as well as its similarity to exemplars not in category A (S
iB
),
  
	  
 (4)
and dividing S
iA
 by the sum similarity to all exemplars,
  
	  
 (5)
The process for determining the probability of giving a “not-In-the-category” response 
(q
i
) is similar,
  
	  
 (6)
The EBRW Defined
 As noted in the section Modeling the Categorization Process, the EBRW’s 
properties also make it a good candidate for accounting for the between-group differences 
observed by Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010). First, its parameters are even more 
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analogous than the GCM to the aspects of cognition shown to be affected by approach 
and avoidance modes. Furthermore, previous efforts made at fitting the GCM to natural 
language categories can be easily translated to the EBRW. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, the EBRW will be used to model between-group differences when RT is 
available. This section will outline the formal properties of the model.
 The EBRW is a random walk model of categorization decisions, where two 
categories are represented as absorbing states at the boundaries of the random walk space. 
According to the EBRW, the categorization process occurs by sampling exemplars from 
memory. The probability that an exemplar is sampled is relative to its similarity to the 
to-be-categorized item. Each exemplar sampled moves the random walk state towards 
the category boundary that the exemplar belongs to. Reaching one of the absorbing 
boundaries represents the end of the categorization decision.
 At its core, the EBRW repurposes the formulas from the GCM. According to the 
EBRW, p
i
 (the probability of placing item i into category A) becomes the probability that 
an exemplar from category A will be sampled by memory and therefore the probability 
that a step will be taken towards the category A boundary (Figure 2). Likewise, q
i
 
becomes the probability that a step will be taken towards the category B boundary. The 
probability that an item i will be put into category A is represented by 
  
	  
 (7)
The parameter A in this equation represents the “In-the-category” boundary – its distance 
above the zero-information point. Likewise, parameter B in this equation represents the 
“Out-of-the-category” boundary – its distance below the zero information point. As one 
becomes larger than the other, the model will predict a bias to respond with the category 
that has the closer boundary. As both boundaries get farther from the zero-information 
point, the model predicts less probability matching and more consistent categorization 
responses. 
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 The EBRW also uses the sum similarity (Equation 3) to predict response time to 
each stimulus. Specifically, it predicts that the time to take any step in the random walk 
process (E(T
step
)) for item i is given by,
  
	  
€ 
E(Tstep | i) = α +1(SiA + SiB ), (8)
where α is a constant that represents the time for cognitive tasks that are independent 
of the similarity calculation and therefore are common across all items, such as time to 
visually encode the jellyfish or press a button once a categorization decision has been 
reached. Note that as similarity to either category increases, the time required to retrieve 
an exemplar and make a step in the random walk process decreases.
 The EBRW predicts that the total number of steps required during the random 
walk process (E(N)) for a given item i is a function of both the probability of placing 
item i in the category or not (Equations 4 and 5), as well as the distance of the decision 
boundaries A and B from the zero-information point (for in and Out-of-the-category, 
respectively):
  
	  
 (9)
The predicted amount of time it should take to categorize an item can be found by 
multiplying Equation 8 by Equation 9.
Locating the Effects of Mode in the EBRW
 To better understand how these parameters can account for the effects of 
motivation on cognition, an example category decision will be modeled with the EBRW 
(Figure 3). Four exemplars are known: two from category A and two from category 
B, while the to-be-categorized item is represented by ‘?”. Each exemplar has two 
dimensions that can take a value from 1 to 5, plotted along axes X and Y. According 
to the EBRW, when attention is evenly divided across both dimensions (i.e., w
1
  = 0.5, 
w
2
 = 0.5), the similarity scaling parameter is small (i.e., c = 1), and both boundaries are 
close and equidistant from the zero-information boundary (i.e., A = 1, B = 1), then there 
is a 33% chance of putting item “?” into category A, and a 66% chance of putting it into 
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category B. This is because the to-be-categorized item is most similar to the category B 
exemplar (5,2), followed by the category A exemplar (3,1).
 To see how these parameters impact categorization decisions and capture the 
effects of motivation on cognition, imagine putting all the attention weight on dimension 
x (i.e., w
1
 = 1, w
2
 = 0) while holding all other parameters the same. This would collapse 
the exemplars across the y dimension. Now, the to-be-categorized item is identical to both 
category B exemplars but it would remain equally dissimilar to the category A exemplars. 
The EBRW now predicts a 7% probability “?” will be put into category A. With all the 
weight on dimension y, however, the to-be-categorized item becomes identical to both A 
exemplars. Now the EBRW predicts an 82% probability that “?” will be put into category 
A. Note that the two values are not reciprocal. This is because the to-be-categorized 
item is more similar to exemplar B(5,2) when the x dimension is collapsed than it is 
to exemplar A(3,1) with the y dimension collapsed. The EBRW’s ability to change 
dimension weights makes it a good model to test the theory that motivational states affect 
Figure 3:Example of a categorization decision as described by the EBRW
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the way attention is distributed during categorization (e.g., Förster et al., 2006; P. A. 
Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008)
 Now imagine that attention is equally distributed across dimensions but the 
similarity scaling parameter (c) is increased. As c gets larger, the probability that the 
to-be-categorized item will be placed into category A decreases exponentially from .20 
when c = 2, to .06 when c = 4, to essentially zero when c = 7. This is because when 
the similarity scaling parameter is low, items that are only moderately similar (such as 
A(3,1)) can still have an impact on the categorization decision. When c is high, however, 
only the most similar items can influence categorization decisions (i.e., B(5,2)). In this 
way, the EBRW can test the theory that approach and avoidance impacts whether people 
attend to what makes things similar or what makes them different. A low c parameter 
reflects a categorizer that is looking for similarities and is including information from 
exemplars that are only moderately similar. A high c parameter reflects a categorizer that 
is looking for dissimilarities and is only including information from the most similar 
exemplars, pushing away moderately typical exemplars. This makes the EBRW a good 
model for testing the theory that motivational state changes whether a person looks for 
similarities or dissimilarities (e.g., Förster, 2009).
 Changing the boundary parameters, A and B, can have two different types 
of effects depending on whether they move equidistantly from the zero-information 
point or one moves more than the other. As A and B equally increase in distance from 
the zero-information point, categorization becomes more deterministic. A categorizer 
with boundaries far apart from each other would be highly consistent—more likely to 
repeatedly put the same in item into the same. In this example, the to-be-categorized 
item has twice as much similarity to exemplars from category B than category A. When 
boundaries A and B both equal 1, the model predicts the categorizer will say B 66% of 
the time. As the boundaries move farther apart, the model predicts the categorizer will say 
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B more and more frequently: 89% of the time when A and B equal 3 and 97% of the time 
when A and B equal 5.
 When one boundary increases and the other remains the same, this creates a 
bias to respond to the category with the closer boundary. A categorizer with a bias to 
respond “In-the-category” would be a more inclusive categorizer and a categorizer with 
a bias to respond “Out-of-the-category” would be a more exclusive categorizer. In the 
current example, as A remains 1 but B moves farther away, the probability of saying A 
increases from 33% when B = 1, to 46% when B = 3 and plateaus at 49% when B = 5 
and higher. In sum, between-group differences in boundary locations in the EBRW model 
can indicate whether participants in one motivation condition are changing their decision 
biases (Markman et al., 2005) or are making more consistent categorization decisions.
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CHAPTER 3 
OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS
 Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010) showed that Conservatives in avoidance 
mode were more exclusive categorizers of natural language category members than 
Conservatives in approach mode. They did not find a difference between Liberals in 
approach and avoidance mode. The purpose of this dissertation is to use two exemplar-
based models of categorization, the GCM and EBRW, to describe these between-group 
differences. 
 Experiment 1 fits the EBRW to the categorization decisions of Conservative and 
Liberal participants in approach and avoidance modes using artificially generated stimuli. 
The stimuli in Experiment 1 have clearly defined dimensions that can be accounted 
for by mathematical models of categorization. These artificial stimuli are typical of the 
categorization experiments to which the EBRW has previously been applied (Nosofsky 
& Palmeri, 1997; Nosofsky & Alfonso-Reese, 1999). The purpose of this experiment 
is to use the EBRW to identify the components in the categorization process where this 
between-group difference occurs.
 Experiment 2 fits the GCM to data from Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010) 
Experiment 1. Exemplar-based models have been fit to natural language categorization 
decisions (Verbeemen et al., 2007; Voorspoels et al., 2008). There has not been 
consistency across prior studies in which the GCM has been fit to natural language 
categories, and some methods are not amenable to identifying between-group 
categorization differences. This experiment has two purposes: 1) to provide a testing 
ground for generating information required by both the GCM and the EBRW to fit 
between-group differences in natural language categorization decisions; and 2) to 
identify differences in the components of categorization that underlie the between-group 
differences observed by Rock and Janoff-Bulman.
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 Experiment 3 fit the EBRW to data that replicated Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s 
(2010) Experiment 1 for two categories and extended it by collecting RTs and adding 
stimuli to each of the two categories. Rock and Janoff-Bulman collected data on 
categorization decisions for 12 items per category and do not record RT. Parameters 
of the EBRW may provide a better analog than the GCM for differences in cognition 
observed between people in approach and avoidance mode, but the EBRW cannot be 
fit to Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s data because they did not record RT. The purpose of 
Experiment 3 is to fit the EBRW to natural language categories in order to locate the 
source of differences between Liberals and Conservatives in approach and avoidance 
mode in categorization decisions.
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPERIMENT 1
 Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010) found that Conservatives in avoidance mode 
were more exclusive categorizers of moderately typical items than Conservatives in 
approach mode, but did not find this difference for Liberals. Experiment 1 uses the 
EBRW to show the components in the categorization process in which this between-
group difference occurs by replicating Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s findings with artificial 
stimuli. The EBRW has been shown to successfully model categorization decisions using 
these types of stimuli (e.g., Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997; Nosofsky & Alfonso-Reese, 
1999).
 The EBRW is a promising model for locating these effects because aspects of 
cognition that approach and avoidance mode have been shown to impact have analogs 
in the model’s parameters. Approach and avoidance mode have been shown to affect the 
spread of attention across dimensions (Friedman & Förster, 2005; P. A. Gable & Harmon-
Jones, 2008). The EBRW has parameters representing the amount of attention given to 
each dimension of the to-be-categorized item. Approach and avoidance mode impact how 
much attention is given to dimensions along which items are similar versus dimensions 
along which items are different (Förster, 2009). The EBRW has a similarity scaling 
parameter that scales the effect of dissimilarities on a categorization decision. Approach 
and avoidance mode can impact where decision criteria are established (Markman 
et al., 2005). The EBRW has random walk boundaries A and B, which can change 
independently representing a bias to respond “In-the-category” or “Out-of-the-category.” 
Additionally, as A and B move farther away from each other, categorization decisions 
become more consistent.
 Experiment 1 uses artificial stimuli: computer drawn jellyfish that vary along 
four dimensions. Similar stimuli have been used in many efforts to model categorization 
judgments (e.g., Kruschke, 1992; Love et al., 2004; Nosofsky, 1984). As discussed 
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in the Literature Review, these stimuli offer a number of attractive features for 
operationalizing the stages of the categorization process. First, the stimuli are unknown 
to the participants, who theoretically do not enter the experiment with preconceived 
ideas about which features are important and which are not. Second, they have a limited 
number feature values (e.g., round vs. square heads, color saturation values, line length) 
along dimensions that are obvious to the categorizer and are amenable to mathematical 
modeling. Third, these stimuli can have family resemblance structures built into them, 
making them potential stand-ins for complex real-world categories (e.g., Medin & 
Schaffer, 1978).
 Stimuli typically used in categorization experiments are comprised of dimensions 
with binary feature values and are often based on the 5/4 category structure created by 
Medin and Schaffer (1978). In real world items, however, features are rarely just present 
or absent; they usually exist along a continuum (e.g., height and color) or are ambiguous 
(e.g., having wings—consider flying squirrels). Furthermore, the use of binary feature 
values gives rise to concerns that participants encounter so few permutations that they 
merely memorize which items are associated with which category labels (Blair & Homa, 
2003). The use of stimuli with features that vary continuously along a set of dimensions 
mitigates this concern. The features of the jellyfish used in this experiment vary 
continuously along four dimensions: 1) color of the internal organs, 2) diameter of the 
bell, 3) thickness of the bell, and 4) tentacle length.
Method
Participants
 Participants were recruited from University of Massachusetts, Amherst 
psychology subject pool. Students in this pool answered four questions about their 
political identity as part of a questionnaire administered at the beginning of the semester 
(see Appendix A). Participants were recruited based on their responses to these questions. 
The answer to the fourth question was reverse-coded and all four responses were 
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averaged together to generate a mean political identity score with a range of 1(Liberal) to 
7(Conservative). In Spring Semester 2011, all pre-screening respondents (n=1200) had 
an average political identity score of 3.4 with a standard deviation of 1.0. Students were 
identified as liberal if their score was one standard deviation or more below the mean or 
as conservative if their score was one standard deviation or more above the mean.
 Students identified as liberal or conservative were contacted via email and 
invited to participate in either this experiment, identified as “Categorizing Jellyfish,” or 
in Experiment 3, identified as “Categorizing Everyday Objects.” Recruitment occurred 
across three semesters. The mean and standard deviation of this political score was 
essentially unchanged across all three semesters. For the Spring Semester 2011 μ = 3.4 
and σ = 1.0, for the Fall Semester 2011 μ = 3.5 and σ = 1.0, and for the Spring Semester 
2012 μ = 3.5 and σ = 1.0. The selection criterion from Spring Semester 2011 was used 
for all three semesters. This selection criterion identified roughly one-third of the students 
as potential participants each semester. Participants were not allowed to sign up for both 
studies.
 One hundred and twenty seven University of Massachusetts, Amherst students 
participated in this study (33 males and 106 females). Data from four of these participants 
were not included in this analysis due to computer error. Of the remaining participants, 50 
were identified as political conservatives and 73 were identified as political liberals. Forty 
participants were placed into the approach condition (20 Liberals, 20 Conservatives), 
41 in the neutral condition (23 Liberals, 18 Conservatives), and 42 in the avoidance 
condition (30 Liberals, 12 Conservatives).
Materials
 The stimuli for this experiment consisted of 16 jellyfish, generated in 
Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). For example jellyfish, see Figure 4. The 
jellyfish were designed with features that varied continuously along four dimensions: 
1) color of the internal organs, 2) diameter of the bell, 3) thickness of the bell, and 4) 
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tentacle length. The stimuli were generated according to one of two methods, one for 
category member items and one for non-category items.
 The category member jellyfish were generated by adding normally distributed 
noise to each feature value of the prototype. The prototype had organ colors with an 
RBG values of [145, 0, 0], a bell diameter of 420 × 210 pixels, a bell thickness of 6.45 
points, and a tentacle length of 25 pixels per segment. (There were nine segments.) 
Figure 4B shows the prototype jellyfish. Three types of category member jellyfish—
highly typical, moderately typical, and atypical—were generated based on a prototype, 
which was not shown during the experiment. Three jellyfish were generated for each 
level of typicality, for a total of nine category member jellyfish stimuli. For highly typical 
category members, the normally distributed noise was set at one standard deviation for 
each dimension. (See Appendix Table C1 for standard deviation values). For moderately 
typical category members, normally distributed noise was set at two standard deviations 
for each dimension. For atypical category members, normally distributed noise was set 
at three standard deviations for each dimension. These category member jellyfish were 
considered as belonging to a category since they all had features similar to the prototype 
and therefore similar to each other. Highly typical jellyfish were most likely to have 
all their features similar to each other and dissimilar to non-category member jellyfish. 
Seven non-category member jellyfish were generated by selecting each dimension’s 
feature value at random from a uniform distribution. Figure 4A and Figure 4C present 
Figure 4: Example jellyfish stimuli. A) Minimum non-category jellyfish values, B) 
Prototype jellyfish values, C) Maximum non-category jellyfish values (Participants did 
not see any of these jellyfish during the experiment.)
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the minimum and maximum values for the non-category member jellyfish, respectively. 
Feature values for each of the 16 stimuli are given in Appendix Table C2. All participants 
saw the same 16 jellyfish.
Procedure
 Upon arriving at the experiment, participants gave their informed consent to 
participate and were brought to a room containing an individual computer. Participants 
received all instructions for the experiment from this computer. After being welcomed 
to the study, they were told that a new species of jellyfish had been discovered (Aurelia 
diatribi) and their task was to learn to distinguish category member jellyfish from non-
category member jellyfish. During the introduction, they were told the four dimensions 
essential to categorizing the jellyfish.
 In the training stage of the experiment, participants were trained on four category 
member jellyfish (High 1-3 and Medium 1) and four non-category jellyfish (Non-category 
1-4). These jellyfish were selected for training to provide participants with a strong sense 
of the feature values associated with the category and to allow for as much variability in 
categorizing atypical items as possible, since participants were not trained on atypical 
stimuli. In Appendix Table C2, all training stimuli are bolded.
 On every trial during training, participants were shown a jellyfish and asked if it 
belonged to the category. After making a categorization decision, they received feedback; 
either “Correct” accompanied by a pleasant tone or “Incorrect” accompanied by a beep. A 
training block consisted of a run through all eight training jellyfish, presented in a random 
order. Training continued until either a participant correctly categorized two blocks of 
jellyfish in a row or they completed 15 blocks.
 In the second stage, participants were primed for approach mode, avoidance 
mode, or a neutral condition. This priming was based on the amoral prime reported in 
Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010). Participants in all conditions were given five minutes to 
list up to ten movies. Participants in the approach condition were asked to list movies to 
42
watch for an enjoyable time, those in the neutral condition were asked to list movies they 
had seen recently, and those in the avoidance condition were asked to list movies to not 
watch to avoid a bad time. These primes were intended to focus approach participants on 
what they should do (i.e., movies they should watch) and avoidance participants on what 
they should not do (i.e., movies they should avoid). The effectiveness of these primes 
was considered exploratory in Rock and Janoff-Bulman. The full text of the priming 
instructions is provided in Appendix B.
 In the third stage, participants were asked to categorize jellyfish without feedback. 
In this stage, each block consisted of sixteen jellyfish: the eight that participants had 
been trained on and eight new jellyfish: two moderately typical, three atypical, and 
three non-category member jellyfish. On each trial, participants saw a jellyfish, made an 
“In-the-category” or an “Out-of-the-category” judgment, and were thanked rather than 
given feedback. Participants completed ten blocks of category judgments and the order 
of jellyfish presentation was randomized within each block. Therefore, the participants 
categorized the 16 jellyfish ten times for a total of 160 categorization judgments. This 
stage took approximately five minutes.
 In the fourth stage, participants were asked to list three goals they aspired to 
achieve and three goals they felt obligated to achieve. The order of these two tasks was 
counterbalanced across participants. Response times to these questions are taken as a 
check of successful priming with approach or avoidance mode (Friedman & Förster, 
2001). Participants the approach mode are expected to respond to faster to desires while 
participants in avoidance mode are expected to respond faster to obligations.
 Finally, in the fifth stage, participants rated the paired similarity of all sixteen 
jellyfish in the study. On each trial, participants saw one jellyfish and then pressed a 
button to see the next. They were asked to decide their similarity on a scale of 1(most 
dissimilar) to 9(most similar). This scale remained on the bottom of the screen at all 
times, and participants were encouraged to use the whole scale. Pair presentation order 
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was random and participants were not asked to make similarity judgments about identical 
jellyfish.
 After completing all five stages, participants were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation. On average, the experiment took participants 30 minutes to complete.
Results
Manipulation check
 The measure of interest for the manipulation check was calculated according 
to Friedman (2001): the amount of time it took participants to start typing each of the 
three goals they aspired to accomplish and each of the three goals they were required to 
accomplish. Differences in the time to start typing were tested by a 3(Mode) × 2(Question 
Type) mixed model ANOVA, with Question Type as a within-subjects factor. First, there 
was a main effect of Question Type. Participants were faster to start typing goals that they 
aspired to achieve (x =  6.35, s = 3.53) than goals that they were required to achieve (x =  
10.04, s = 5.63), F(1,116) = 101.96, p < .001 . There was, however, neither a main effect 
of Mode (F(2,116) = 0.81, p = .45) nor an interaction between Mode and Question Type 
(F(2,116) = 0.35, p = .71).
Category learning
 A participant was considered to have successfully learned the category if they 
either got two blocks correct in a row or got seven or more out of eight correct on the last 
block of training. By this measure, 91 out of the 123 participants successfully learned 
the category. Category learning did not differ either by Mode, χ2(2) = 0.22, p = .90, or 
Political Identity χ2(1) = 0.18, p = .67. Only participants who learned the category were 
included in further categorization performance and modeling analyses.
Categorization performance
 Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010) found that Conservatives primed with avoidance 
mode were more exclusive when categorizing moderately typical category members as 
compared to Conservatives primed with approach mode. The category inclusivity for 
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Liberals, however, was the same regardless of whether they were primed with approach 
or avoidance mode. Since it is the goal of this study to identify the stage in categorization 
that approach and avoidance motivation effects, it is first necessary to show that there was 
a difference in the categorization performance of these two groups in this study as well.
 In order to identify between-group differences in categorization performance, 
the percentage of jellyfish included in the category by each participant was averaged 
across highly typical members, moderately typical members, atypical members, and 
non-members, resulting in four category-inclusion measures for each participant. As can 
be seen in Table 1, category inclusion is high for highly typical and moderately typical 
category members, less for atypical members, and low for non-category members. These 
results are broken down by gender in Appendix Table F1 and Appendix Table F2.
 To normalize the distribution, categorization inclusion percentages were arcsine 
transformed and then submitted to a 4(Typicality) × 3(Mode) × 2(Political Identity) 
mixed model ANOVA, with Typicality as a within-subjects factor. As expected, there 
was a main effect of Typicality, F(3,255) = 534.0, p < .001. Additionally, there was an 
interaction between Mode and Political Identity, F(2,85) =  4.2, p < .05. This means 
that, averaged across category typicality, there was a difference between Liberals and 
Conservatives in how mode affected category inclusion. The three-way interaction 
between Mode Manipulation, Political Identity, and Typicality that would have directly 
Table 1 
Average %yes Judgments (and SE) by Manipulation and Stimulus Type
Group High Medium Atypical Non-category Total
Liberal
  Approach .88(.02) .91(.02) .76(.04) .21(.03) .69(.02)
  Neutral .83(.03) .83(.04) .68(.04) .16(.04) .62(.03)
  Avoidance .89(.03) .93(.02) .75(.03) .21(.02) .69(.02)
Conservative
  Approach .83(.03) .78(.05) .68(.03) .19(.03) .62(.03)
  Neutral .90(.05) .90(.05) .70(.05) .18(.02) .67(.03)
  Avoidance .91(.02) .93(.02) .70(.04) .13(.02) .67(.02)
Total .87(.01) .88(.02) .71(.02) .19(.01)
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replicated Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010) results was not significant, F(6,255) = 1.2, 
p  = .308.
 To investigate the interaction between Mode and Political Identity, two different 
analyses were performed. First, the proportion of “In-the-category” decisions was 
averaged across all four typicality levels (Table 1), creating an overall measure of 
category inclusion. Since the result of interest is how approach and avoidance modes 
affect categorization decisions, this measure was subjected to two follow-up analyses, 
one testing the effect of approach mode and the other testing the effects of avoidance 
mode. For participants in approach mode, Liberals were more inclusive categorizers 
than Conservatives (Table 1), F(1,28) = 4.4, p < .05. For participants in avoidance mode, 
there was no significant difference between Liberal and Conservative participants, 
F(1,28) = .885, p = .355.
 Additionally, a signal detection analysis was performed on these data. Signal 
detection decomposes hit rates and false alarm rates into a measure of participants 
abilities to distinguish category members from non-category members (measured in d'), 
as well as their criterion for placing an item in the category versus out of the category 
(measured in c
SD
). A c
SD
 of 0 indicates that a categorizer is optimizing their judgments to 
maximize percent correct, a negative c indicates that the categorizer is including more 
to-be-categorized items than optimal, and a positive c indicates that the categorizer is 
excluding more to-be-categorized items than optimal. Hit rates were measured as the 
percentage of all category members included in the category and false alarms were 
measured as the percentage of all non-category members included in the category. Hit 
rates at ceiling were transformed by subtracting one included category member and false 
alarm rates at floor were transformed by adding one included non-category member. The 
average results for these analyses are reported in Table 2.
 Both d' and c
SD
 were submitted to a 3 (Mode) × 2 (Political Identity) ANOVA. 
For d', there were no significant between group differences. The ability to distinguish 
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category members from non-category members did not differ between Mode 
(F(2,85) = 2.30, p = .11), between Political Identity (F(1,85) = 0.01, p = .94), nor was 
there an interaction between the two (F(2,85) = 0.81, p = .45). For c
SD
, while there was 
no main effect of Mode (F(2,85) = 0.24, p = .79) or Political Identity (F(1,85) = 0.97, 
p = .33), the interaction between the two was significant (F(2,85) = 3.75, p < .05). Follow 
up analyses of this interaction show that there are no significant differences between 
participants Liberals and Conservatives in approach mode, F(1,28) = 2.50, p = .13. 
Liberals in avoidance mode, however, have a more inclusive criterion than Conservatives 
in avoidance mode, F(1,28) = 4.32, p < .05.
Modeling
 Participants’ categorization decisions and response times were fit with the EBRW. 
As outlined in the Literature Review, the EBRW combines an item’s similarity to the 
exemplars in the category (S
iA
) with its similarity to exemplars out of the category (S
iB
) 
to predict both the probability that the item will be categorized as “In-the-category,” as 
defined by Equation 7, as well as the RT to that item, as defined by Equations 8 and 9. 
Since the EBRW predicts RT in arbitrary units, predicted RT is scaled to milliseconds 
by a linear regression, with slope k and intercept μ. For each model, the EBRW was fit 
to four different data sets: categorization responses and response times averaged within 
Liberals and Conservatives in approach and avoidance mode.1
1 In Experiment 1, the EBRW can be fit to individual participants’ data as well as 
Table 2 
Average Parameter Values (and SE) for Signal Detection Analysis
Group d' cSD
Liberal
  Approach 1.95(0.12) -0.10(0.07)
  Neutral 2.08(0.15) 0.12(0.11)
  Avoidance 2.08(0.12) -0.18(0.07)
Conservative
  Approach 1.74(0.18) 0.08(0.08)
  Neutral 2.08(0.18) -0.09(0.10)
  Avoidance 2.27(0.09) 0.08(.09)
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 For the first step in the modeling process, a fully constrained version of the 
EBRW was fit to all four data sets. This model found the c, the set of w parameters, the 
A and B boundaries, and α that best minimized the weighted sum of squared deviations 
(WSSD) between the observed and predicted proportion of “in-the-category” judgments 
and observed and predicted average response times for each of the 16 stimuli. The WSSD 
method was proposed by Nosofsky and Stanton (2005) as a way to combine these two 
error sources, which are measured on different scales. WSSD weights the error of each 
prediction by the inverse of the data point’s squared standard error. Therefore, category 
decisions and RT are standardized to a similar scale and data points with smaller 
variability play a larger role in the fit measure. The fully constrained model was run 100 
times with random starting points to guard against local minima, and the parameters 
from the best fitting model were kept. Next, this model was run again 100 times with the 
best fitting parameters as its starting point, with each parameter permuted by normally 
distributed noise (N(0,1)).
 The next step in model fitting was to allow parameters to vary between groups. 
The data were fit with models that allowed either c, all w weights, A, B or both A and B 
to vary between groups. Parameters were allowed to vary one of three ways: between 
Liberals and Conservatives participants, participants in approach mode and avoidance 
mode, and Conservatives in avoidance mode compared to all others. This last model 
was included because of the interaction found by Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010). Each 
model was fit 100 times using the best fitting parameters of the fully constrained model 
plus normally distributed noise as starting points. The predictions of the best fitting 
models can be found in Appendix Table F4.
 Since the EBRW has no known likelihood fit measure (Nosofsky & Stanton, 
2005), models in Experiment 1 were compared with cross-validation (Browne, 2000). 
averaged data. Although this method is recommended when possible (Maddox, 1999), to 
do so for Experiment 1 would mean that each data point being modeled is the average of 
only ten trials. The EBRW was fit to individual participant’s data and statistical tests of 
the parameters are reported Appendix Table F3.
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Cross-validation fits the model to one set of data and tests it on another. It is based on 
the assumption that a model that is too complex will adjust its parameters to fit noise in 
the data and do a poor job of predicting new data. Cross-validation was implemented by 
cycling through each to-be-categorized item, fitting each of the models with that item’s 
categorization and RT data withheld, and then using the resulting parameters to predict 
the withheld data. Each model’s cross-validation fit measure is the average of its WSSD 
across all predicted data points, and this value can be found in the Appendix Table F4.
 The best fitting model allowed the c parameter to vary between Conservatives 
in avoidance mode and all other participants. Figure 5 shows the averaged category 
inclusion rates and model predictions and Figure 6 shows the averaged RT and model 
predictions. These data were best fit by a model that allowed Conservatives in avoidance 
mode to have a larger c parameter (c
ConAvo
 = 1.20) than other participants (c
Other
 = 0.58). 
This indicates that, for Conservatives in avoidance mode, the functional relationship 
between psychological distance and psychological similarity dropped off more steeply 
than for other participants.
Discussion
 Liberal and Conservative participants in Experiment 1 were primed with approach 
or avoidance mode and then made categorization decisions about a newly learned 
category. Analyses of the categorization performance indicate that, overall, Liberals 
were more inclusive categorizers than Conservatives. ANOVA analyses show that in 
approach mode they are more inclusive overall and signal detection analyses show that 
in avoidance mode, Liberals have a more inclusive criterion than Conservatives. When 
the EBRW model of categorization was fit to individual participant’s categorization 
decisions, analyses indicate that Conservatives in avoidance mode had a larger c 
parameter. These results provide evidence that exemplar-based models in general, 
and the EBRW specifically, can be used to account for between-group differences 
in categorization decisions. While the manipulation check did not find significant 
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Figure 5: Average and model predicted percent “in-category” judgments by stimulus
Figure 6: Average and model predicted RT by stimulus
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differences between-groups, inferential statistics of the categorization performance 
indicate that the manipulation may have been effective.
 In previous applications of the GCM (e.g., Nosofsky, 1987; Nosofsky & Zaki, 
1998) and the EBRW (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997), the scaling parameter is taken 
as a measure of memory - how well participants can distinguish one exemplar from 
another. Nosofsky and Palmeri showed that the categorization and memory performance 
differences between normal participants and amnesiacs could be modeled with just 
a change in the scaling parameter, indicating that the amnesiacs’ deficit came from a 
reduced ability to distinguish between exemplars. Nosofsky (1987) showed that when 
participants learned a category over many learning trials across a number of sessions, the 
scaling parameter increased across sessions, indicating an improved ability to distinguish 
between exemplars.
 It is not necessary to conclude, however, that being in avoidance mode increased 
the Conservative participants’ ability to distinguish between exemplars but did not do so 
for Liberal participants. Another interpretation is that avoidance mode made Conservative 
participants less willing to factor moderately similar exemplars into their categorization 
decisions. For these conservative participants, the to-be-categorized items were put into 
the same category as exemplars that were highly similar to them. The distance calculation 
of the EBRW (Equation 1) starts at zero distance between an item and an exemplar and 
only increases when there are dissimilarities between the two. An increased similarity 
scaling parameter, therefore, can be interpreted as placing an increased weight on 
dissimilarities.
 There are two theories about the way in which approach and avoidance mode 
impacts the distribution of attention. Some researchers have found evidence that approach 
and avoidance modes modulate the focus of attention from the big picture to the fine 
details (e.g., Friedman & Förster, 2005; P. A. Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008), while others 
have found that approach and avoidance modulates how attention is distributed across 
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dimensions that highlight similarities or differences (Förster, 2009). These theories are 
not necessarily in competition with each other and parameter differences in the EBRW 
could have found evidence for both. That said, the results of this study can be taken as 
evidence for the theory that avoidance focuses people on dissimilarities. This effect, 
however, was only found for Conservatives. Liberals were likely not as susceptible to 
the avoidance mode manipulation, since approach mode is found to be dominant in the 
personality of Liberals (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008; Rock & Janoff-Bulman, 2010).
 The impacts of the mode manipulation were modest in Experiment 1. The 
category-inclusion ANOVA analysis, the signal detection analysis, and the modeling 
analysis all found significant differences between different groups within the study. It is 
possible that the approach and avoidance manipulation did not succeed in significantly 
manipulating participants’ mode or perhaps the task of categorizing previously unseen 
items washed out much of the experimentally generated context. What is most important 
for the purposes of this dissertation, however, is that the EBRW was able to capture the 
source of reliable difference between Liberals and Conservatives.
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENT 2
 Experiment 1 showed that an exemplar-based model of categorization, the EBRW, 
can be used to identify between-group differences in components of the categorization 
process for artificial stimuli. In order to account for the effects of avoidance mode 
observed in Conservatives by Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010), exemplar-based models 
must also be able to identify between-group differences for natural language category 
stimuli. The GCM, a related exemplar-based model of categorization, has already been 
applied to natural language categories (Verbeemen et al., 2007; Verheyen et al., 2010; 
Voorspoels et al., 2008). None of these studies of natural language categorization, 
however, have used the GCM to identify between-group differences in components of the 
categorization process.
 To show that exemplar-based models can identify components of the 
categorization process in which natural language categorization differs between 
categorizers in approach versus avoidance mode, Experiment 2 will fit the GCM to the 
data collected by Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010). The GCM is used to model these data 
because the GCM does not require RTs, which were not collected by Rock and Janoff-
Bulman. As discussed in the Literature Review, the GCM compares a to-be-categorized 
item to exemplars and categorizes it based on the category membership of the exemplars 
to which it is most similar. The GCM shares a number of parameters with the EBRW (c 
and the w attention weights). These parameters break down the categorization process in 
a way that provides analogs with the ways that approach and avoidance mode have been 
shown to impact the spread of attention.
 Fitting the GCM to these data will provide a test for generating information 
required by both the GCM and the EBRW to fit between-group differences in natural 
language categorization decisions, such as identifying objective methods of generating a 
similarity space and supplying a set of exemplars. Previous researchers who have applied 
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the GCM to natural language categories have based their similarity space on a subjective 
list of features for each exemplar (e.g., Smits et al., 2002; Storms, De Boeck, & Ruts, 
2001; Verbeemen et al., 2007; Voorspoels et al., 2008). Typically, these researchers have 
one group of participants generate a list of features that could apply to the whole category 
and have a second group decide whether these features are applicable to each exemplar. 
The resulting feature matrix is then transformed to a set of coordinate points with MDS. 
Researchers have advocated this method over pairwise similarity ratings based on its 
improved correlation with category related measures such as typicality ratings and 
response time (Dry & Storms, 2009; Vanpaemel, Verbeemen, Dry, Verguts, & Storms, 
2010). 
 Using feature lists, however, can cause problems for modeling between-group 
differences. One concern is that dimensions that are important in certain contexts may 
not be generated in other contexts and therefore may be missed. Wu and Barsalou 
(2009) found that when participants were asked to list the properties related to a 
concept, participants’ responses depended on how they mentally simulated that concept. 
Similarly, Murphy and Medin (1985) argue that concepts have an infinite set of features 
whose importance relative to their category membership depends on the context in 
which they are placed. Finally, dimensions based on feature lists incorporate categorical 
judgments about the values of those features, which is problematic when feature values 
are continuous. Some participants may not list features with continuous values, so a 
dimension for those features will not be created. For example, a dimension of “wings” 
is based on discrete feature values like absent or present, but in the case of a flying 
squirrel—a creature that only moderately has wings—some participants may not list 
wings as a feature, so a dimension of “wings” will not be created.
 Modeling Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010) data allows for an exploration of 
more objective methods of creating a similarity space. Instead of subjective judgments, 
Latent Semantic Analysis ( LSA, Deerwester, Dumais, Furnas, Landauer, & Harshman, 
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1990; Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998) will be used to generate a similarity space 
and the best MDS scaling result will be identified by comparing it to Rosch’s (1975) 
typicality data.
Method
The Original Study
 The data used in Experiment 2 come from Experiment 1 of Rock and Janoff-
Bulman (2010). Their study was conducted to identify differences in the effect of 
approach and avoidance mode on the categorization decisions of participants from across 
the political spectrum. First, participants were primed with either approach or avoidance 
mode using questions about movies or moral behavior. Participants in a neutral condition 
had no prime. After priming, participants were asked to make a series of categorization 
decisions for 60 items from five natural language categories: Carpenters’ Tools, Clothes, 
Furniture, Vehicles and Weapons. These items were taken from a larger stimulus set used 
by Rosch (1975) and typicality ratings from Rosch’s study were used to select four highly 
typical exemplars, four moderately typical exemplars, and four atypical exemplars for 
each of the natural language categories. While the current analyses will be performed on 
each natural language category separately, Rock and Janoff-Bulman summed responses 
across categories and used total number of “Out-of-the-category” judgments as their 
dependent variable. As can be seen in Figure 7, they found that for participants in 
avoidance mode, exclusivity increased with conservatism, but they did not find this effect 
for participants in approach mode.
The Model
 Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010) data will be reanalyzed by fitting the GCM to 
each natural language category. The GCM determines the probability of placing a to-be-
categorized item in a given category by its similarity to exemplars. Similarity between 
the item and members of that category increases the probability of inclusion and its 
similarity between the item and exemplars not in the category decreases the probability 
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of inclusion (Equations 5 and 6). As discussed in the Introduction, a possible explanation 
for the effects of approach and avoidance on categorization is that being in approach 
mode increases the categorizer’s consistency. That is, instead of probability matching, a 
consistent categorizer will almost always place an item in a given category if there is a 
greater than chance probability that it is a member. This idea was formalized in the GCM 
by Ashby and Maddox (1993), who modified the calculation of similarity (Equation 3) 
with the inclusion of γ, termed the determinism parameter,
  
	  
 (10)
 For a categorizer with a small γ, the model predicts that items similar to both the 
In-the-category exemplars and the Out-of-the-category exemplars will be categorized 
probabilistically. For a categorizer with a large γ, the model predicts that these items will 
always be categorized as either In-the-category or Out-of-the-category, depending on 
which is considered more likely. As an example, imagine deciding whether a yacht is a 
Vehicle. Assume that Yacht has a sum similarity to all vehicle exemplars equal to 2 and a 
similarity to non-vehicle exemplars equal to 1. When γ equals 1, the GCM predicts that a 
Figure 7: Figure 1 from Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010) 
showing the results of their Experiment 1 for moderately 
typical items.
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yacht will be categorized as a vehicle 
	  
 66% of the time. When γ equals 2, the GCM 
increases the probability to 
	  
 80% and when γ equals 3, the GCM increases the 
probability to 
	  
 89%.
Populating the Model with Exemplars
 At the heart of an exemplar model is the idea that a to-be-categorized item is 
compared to a set of exemplars. The version GCM fit in Experiment 2 will be populated 
with a list of exemplars that are potential category members and exemplars associated 
with the to-be-categorized items. This is based on the assumption that if you ask a person 
if an item is a Vehicle, they are at most likely to compare it with:
 1.  Exemplars that are known to be vehicles. Other known category members have 
been shown to impact unrelated categorization decisions (Brooks, Norman, & Allen, 
1991);
 2.  Exemplars that are similar to vehicles but are not vehicles. An item’s similarity 
to members of a contrasting category has been shown to impact categorization decisions 
about that item (Verheyen et al., 2011); and
 3.  Exemplars that are associated with the item through common usage or lexical 
effects. Associations between words that are lexical neighbors have been shown to impact 
categorization decision times (Rodd, 2004).
 As mentioned above, Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010) selected their stimuli as a 
subset of stimuli used in a study by Rosch (1975). Since Rosch’s original category lists 
contained many more items—some highly typical of their category, some highly atypical, 
and some related but not in the category—the remainder of these lists were added to the 
GCM as exemplars (x
j
) to flesh out the similarity comparisons of the to-be-categorized 
items (x
i
). The shortest list (Vehicles) had 47 items while the longest lists (Carpenters’ 
Tools and Weapons) had 60 items. 
 In addition to potential category members, a to-be-categorized item could bring 
to mind exemplars that are associated though common usage. For instance, when a 
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couch is Furniture, a categorizer may bring to mind a psychiatrist, even though hopefully 
a psychiatrist is not in danger of being mistaken for Furniture. Therefore, for each 
stimulus used by Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010), up to three words frequently named 
during a word association task (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998) were included in 
the exemplar list. The rules for selecting associated words were: 1) they could not be 
members of the category in question, 2) they were a concrete noun, and 3) they could not 
be related to the target by an IS-A, HAS-A, MADE-OF, or IS-A-TYPE-OF relationship. 
These rules assured that every item considered was on the same taxonomic level and 
would not lead to awkward questions, like “Is an engine a vehicle?” Such questions 
would not be answerable without more information, like “What object does the engine 
help to make up?” Only exemplars at the same taxonomic level are useful for making a 
categorization decision.
Approximating Category Membership
 According to the GCM, a to-be-categorized item is compared to all other 
exemplars whose category membership is known. This requires a measure of whether 
an exemplar is a member of a given category. WordNet (Princeton University, 2010), 
an Internet based dictionary, provided such a measure. WordNet is unique in that it 
represents the meaning of a word both through a dictionary definition as well as a series 
of taxonomic relations between words as determined by lexicographers.
 For the purposes of the model, exemplars were considered a member of a given 
category if either their dictionary definition or their taxonomy mentioned the category. 
As an example of the later, according to WordNet, a car is a motor vehicle, which is a 
self-propelled vehicle, which is a wheeled vehicle, which is a vehicle. Therefore, a car 
is considered a vehicle for the purposes of the GCM. It is defined, however, as, “a motor 
vehicle with four wheels.” This definition would also be sufficient for it to be considered 
a vehicle for the purposes of the GCM. This method, however, presents a problem. 
Two of the categories used by Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010) did not appear reliably 
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indexed and therefore cannot be fit by the GCM using this method. There is no category 
of Carpenters’ Tools in Wordnet. Additionally, weapons appear to be haphazardly labeled. 
For instance, “knife” has two definitions: one in the taxonomy for Tool and one in the 
taxonomy for Weapon, but “switchblade” appears only in the taxonomy for Tool. Fitting 
a prototype model as a method to address this will be discussed in the Additional Models 
section. Two potential members of the category Furniture are not represented in Wordnet 
(“end table” and “night table”) and were removed from the list of exemplars.
 Many of the words used as exemplars are polysemous, and category membership 
depends on which meaning is selected. For example, a table is not only a piece of 
furniture, but a format for arranging information. Therefore, definitions were selected 
based on the following criteria: 1) if any one of the definitions was a member of the 
category in question, that definition was used, and 2) if multiple definitions were 
members of the category in question (e.g., a jumper is a sweater, a children’s cover-all, 
and a jacket), the first definition was used. 
Determining the Similarity Space
 The GCM requires all exemplars to be represented in a multidimensional 
similarity space. A more objective way to generate a similarity space than methods 
previously used to fit the GCM to natural language categories (Dry & Storms, 2009; 
Vanpaemel et al., 2010) is to compute measures of semantic distance based on LSA 
(Deerwester et al., 1990; Landauer et al., 1998). LSA uses collections of digitized texts 
and defines a word’s meaning as the index of the various passages in which it occurs. The 
similarity between two words can be calculated by the overlap of the contexts in which 
they co-occur (as well as co-not-occur). Using a variety of passages for LSA ensures 
that words will occur in a variety of contexts so that context-dependent similarity can be 
captured. For the purposes of fitting the GCM, passages were taken from books on the 
website Project Gutenberg that were selected as being appropriate for college freshmen.
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 Again, these three measures were evaluated on their ability to predict Rosch’s 
typicality data. Rosch (1975) herself defines an item as being typical of its category when 
it is similar to category members and dissimilar to non-category members and this theory 
has been verified empirically (Verheyen et al., 2011). An approximation of category 
typicality was generated for each of the three measures by summing the similarity of each 
exemplar to all category members (as defined by WordNet) and subtracting its similarity 
to non-category exemplars. This produced three typicality measures for each exemplar: 
one for each similarity measure.
Converting Similarity to Distance
 The next step to fitting the GCM was to convert the similarity space to geometric 
locations using MDS. When this technique was applied in Experiment 1, the optimal 
number of dimensions for the solution was a priori known to be four: one for each 
dimension of the jellyfish. For a natural language category, however, the correct number 
of dimensions needs to be inferred. Therefore, a series of MDS solutions were generated 
with up to 20 dimensions. For each solution, an item’s distance from category members 
(as determined from WordNet) was subtracted from that item’s distance from non-
category members (as determined from WordNet) to create a measure of that item’s 
typicality. A typical item would be distant from non-category members and close to 
category members and score highly on this measure.
 These typicality measures were correlated with Rosch’s (1975) typicality 
data. The optimal dimensional solution was identified by locating the “elbow” in the 
correlation coefficients, where adding additional dimensions does not notably improve 
correlation. A similar criterion for fitting Prototype models to natural language categories 
was advocated by Verheyen, Ameel and Storms (2007). Optimal dimensionality and 
correlation between the generated measure of typicality and Rosch’s typicality data are 
given in Table 3 and graphs of these correlations for all dimensions are given in Appendix 
Figure D2.
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Generating the Data
 While the GCM is designed to predict probabilistic categorization behavior, Rock 
and Janoff-Bulman (2010) only collected one categorization decision per item from each 
participant. This may be a necessity when using natural language stimuli since asking 
participants about the same stimulus multiple times may generate demand characteristics 
for participants to change their answers. Participants who are asked if an olive is a 
fruit many times may think that the experimenter is unhappy with their first response. 
Therefore, in order to generate data that can be fit by the GCM, categorization responses 
were combined across participants to derive the proportion of participants who placed a 
given item in the category.
 First, participants were grouped by political leaning. Participants in this 
experiment were asked the same political identity questions used to identify eligible 
participants to Experiment 1 and political identity scores were calculated the same way. 
Participants had a mean political identity score of 3.47 and a standard deviation of 0.62. 
Liberals were identified as participants whose political identity score was one or more 
standard deviation below the mean. Conservatives were identified as participants whose 
political identity score was one or more standard deviation above the mean. Participants 
with missing or obviously incorrectly entered data were removed from the analysis. 
Out of the remaining 139 participants, 66 were identified as liberal and 73 identified as 
conservative. Due to the relevance of political leanings to Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s 
conclusions, politically neutral participants were excluded from this analysis. Forty-seven 
participants were primed with Approach mode (Lib = 25, Con = 22), 59 with Avoidance 
Table 3 
Optimal Number of MDS Dimensions and Correlation with Measured Typicality by 
Category
Clothing Furniture Vehicles
r 0.67 0.59 0.48
# of Dimensions 4 7 9
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mode (Lib = 24, Con = 35), and 33 were in the Neutral Condition (Lib = 17, Con = 16). 
Participants in the moral and amoral primes were combined together, since no difference 
between these groups was identified in the original study. Participants’ categorization 
decisions were combined within their groups to create the data modeled by the GCM.
Results
 Since Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010) conclusions concerned Liberals and 
Conservatives in approach or avoidance condition, only these four data sets were 
modeled. This provided 48 data points to each model (12 to-be-categorized items × 4 
groups). The models were fit as follows. First, a fully constrained model was fit that used 
the same c, w, and γ parameters for each of the four data sets. This model was run 100 
times with random starting points, and the parameters of the best fitting model were kept. 
The models were evaluated based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC, Burnham 
& Anderson, 2002). AIC uses the log likelihood of a predicted model having produced 
the observed data and then penalizes this measure for every parameter in the model. This 
method of measuring a model’s fit is appropriate in Experiment 2 because it includes a 
likelihood measure for binary categorization responses (Wickens, 1982).
 Next, a series of models that allowed between-group variability in parameters 
were fit. For each parameter type (c, w, and γ), three types of model were fit. The first 
model type allowed the given parameter to vary between participants in approach and 
avoidance mode. The second model type allowed the given parameter to vary between 
Liberal and Conservative participants. The third model type allowed the given parameter 
to vary between Conservatives in avoidance mode and all other participants since this 
was the significant interaction identified by Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010). Each 
model was fit 100 times, each time starting with the best fitting parameters from the fully 
constrained model permuted with random numbers sampled from the normal distribution 
N(0,1). The fully constrained model was rerun with the same method of generating 
starting values as the other models. Therefore, ten models in total were tested: three 
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between-group contrasts for each of the three parameter types, plus the fully constrained 
model. Again, AIC was used to select the best fitting model from among these 10 models. 
The parameter values and AIC scores for all models are shown in Appendix F.
Clothing
 For clothing, the best fitting fully constrained model (five parameters-3 w, c, and 
γ) fit with an AIC = 87.8. This model was improved on by allowing γ to vary between 
participants in the approach and avoidance conditions (six parameters), AIC = 86.8. The 
best fitting model fit both conditions with a c of 31.08, a w
range
 of .80 and fit participants in 
approach mode with a γ of 5.06 and participants in avoidance mode with a γ of 4.03. The 
parameter values and AIC scores for all models are shown in Appendix F. Participants 
in approach mode were best fit with a higher gamma than participants in avoidance 
mode, indicating that they are more consistent than participants in avoidance mode. The 
range of w weights, .8, indicates that the majority of attention weight was placed on one 
dimension. Figure 8 shows participant performance paired with model predictions.
Figure 8: Best fitting model predictions for Clothing alongside participants’ responses
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Furniture
 For furniture, the best fitting fully constrained model (8 parameters-6 w, c, and 
γ) fit with an AIC = 215.3. This model was improved on by allowing γ to vary between 
Liberals and Conservatives (9 parameters), AIC = 215.0. The best fitting model fit both 
conditions with a c of 20.14, a w
range
 of .51 and fit Liberal participants with a γ of 4.33 
and Conservative participants with a γ of 3.58. The parameter values and AIC scores 
for all models are shown in Appendix F. Liberals were best fit with a higher γ than 
Conservatives, indicating that they categorized more consistently. The w weight range of 
.51 implies that participants spread their attention across more dimensions for Furniture 
than they did for Clothing. Figure 9 shows participant performance paired with model 
predictions.
Vehicles
 For vehicles, the best fitting fully constrained model (10 parameters-8 w, c, and 
γ) fit with an AIC = 311.9. This model was improved on by allowing γ to vary between 
Figure 9: Best fitting model predictions for Furniture alongside participants’ responses
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Conservative participants in the avoidance mode compared with all other participants (11 
parameters), AIC = 305.0. The best fitting model fit both conditions with a c of 8.05, a 
w
range
 of .52 and fit Conservative participants in avoidance mode with a γ of 9.97 and all 
other participants with a γ of 8.73.  The parameter values and AIC scores for all models 
are shown in Appendix F. Conservative participants in avoidance mode were best fit with 
a higher gamma than Liberal participants or Conservative participants in approach mode. 
Again, a w weight range of .51 implies that attention was distributed across multiple 
dimensions.
 Figure 10 shows participant performance paired with model predictions. Note 
that the fits for wheelbarrow and go-cart show more error than other fits so far presented. 
For wheelbarrow, this is because WordNet represents wheelbarrows as Vehicles, and the 
model is unable to totally disregard this representation when participants do not agree. 
While the model can represent uncertainty about a to-be-categorized item based on the 
exemplars that it is similar to, it would be an overly flexible model if it could account for 
Figure 10: Best fitting model predictions for Vehicles alongside participants’ responses
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any categorization performance with a given similarity space. As for go-carts, WordNet 
does not represent them as Vehicles while participants believe that they are. This may be 
due to confusion between go-carts (strollers) and go-karts (small racing vehicles).
Additional Modeling Considerations
Alternate Models
 This section presents two alternate models that were tested but not included in the 
final results because they did not provide a better fit (as measured by AIC) than the more 
basic model originally described. The first addresses the effect of exemplar frequency. 
In some versions of the GCM (e.g., Nosofsky, 1988), the similarity between a to-be-
categorized item and an exemplar (Equation 3) is weighted by frequency of the exemplar, 
represented by the equation,
  
	  
 (11)
where Ν
j
 represents the number of times item j was shown during the experiment. In 
some category learning experiments, stimuli are presented at different rates and this is 
shown to moderate their impact on future categorization decisions.
 Even when people are familiar with items with before they enter the experiment, 
they may be much more familiar with some items than others. It is unlikely that 
Conservatives and Liberals have substantially different kinds of encounters with objects 
in their daily lives (e.g., if conservatives saw more ashtrays than liberals), which could 
cause differences in categorization. Instead, it may be important to include an examplar 
frequency weight to account for between-item differences in categorization. For example, 
people may directly associate chairs with Furniture, and so the chair exemplar would 
wholly drive the categorization decision. On the other hand, when people categorize 
ashtrays they may include category information from many other items, since people see 
few ashtrays and therefore an ashtray’s own category information carries little weight.
 These frequency weights do not need to be free parameters (that is, fit to the 
categorization data) since every exemplar needs one estimate. Free parameters would 
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greatly increase the complexity of the model. Instead, frequency weights can be 
approximated from a separate data set. While it is impossible to know for certain how 
often University of Massachusetts undergraduates encounter chairs and ashtrays, word 
frequency counts from a large corpus such as Subtlex (Brysbaert & New, 2009) are a 
good approximation. RT in a lexical decision task has been shown to be (relatively) 
sigmoidally related to log
10
(word frequency/million) (Emmanuel, Kevin, & Marc, 2010). 
Based on the assumption that time to make a lexical decision reflects the accessibility of 
an exemplar, this log transformation was used to approximate exemplar frequency (Ν
j
 in 
Equation 11). As examples, a low frequency exemplar such as divan received a weight 
of .28 while a high frequency exemplar such as sofa received an activation weight of .68. 
Multi-word exemplars, such as high fidelity stereo system, were not indexed in Subtlex, 
and were approximated with the average N
j
.
 For the most part, including frequency information neither improved the model 
fit nor qualitatively changed the results. When frequency information was included 
for Clothing, the best fitting model also allowed γ to vary between participants in the 
approach and avoidance conditions, AIC = 81.53 (as compared to AIC = 86.8 without 
it). When included for Furniture, the best fitting model also allowed γ to vary between 
Liberal and Conservative participants, AIC = 252.18 (as compared to AIC = 215.0 
without it). When frequency information was included for Vehicles, the best fitting model 
allowed c to vary between Conservatives in avoidance mode and all other participants, 
AIC = 315.6 (as compared to AIC = 305.0 without it).
 For two out of the three categories (Furniture and Vehicles), the fit was 
worsened by the inclusion of frequency information. For Clothing, the improvement in 
fit gained by including frequency information was modest. Additionally, for Clothing 
and Furniture, the best fitting models allowed the same parameters to vary as without 
frequency information. For Vehicles, the best fitting still allowed parameters to vary 
between Conservatives in avoidance mode and all others, but now it identified c as the 
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distinguishing variable. These differences in model performance are not a significant 
enough improvement to justify including a model with frequency weights in the results 
or in future attempts to fit exemplar-based models of categorization to natural language 
categories.
 The second alternate model considered was a prototype-based model. Since a 
prototype model determines category membership based on the similarity of a to-be-
categorized item to a category prototype, using a prototype model avoids the requirement 
of knowing the category membership for any exemplars, making it possible to model 
Weapons and Carpenters’ Tools. A prototype model proposed by Nosofsky (1987) 
provides a series of equations similar to the GCM. In this model, distance between the to-
be-categorized item and a prototype of category A is given by,
  
	  
 (12)
where P
Am
 is the value of the prototype for category A along dimension m. Similarity 
between item i and prototype P
A
 is given by,
  
	  
 (13)
Similarity to the prototype directly determines the probability of placing the item into 
category A,
  
	  
 (14)
where δ is a free parameter representing a threshold level of similarity to a prototype that 
an item must achieve to be placed in that prototype’s category. Note that there is no γ in 
this model, since it would be mathematically conflated with the c parameter.
 To fit this model, the similarity between all words from Rosch’s (1975) list and 
their category label (representing the prototype) were found using LSA, and the best 
number of dimensions for the MDS solution was determined by correlating Rosch’s 
typicality results with the distance between each word and its category prototype. While 
this MDS solution was generated with the same exemplars used in the GCM model, only 
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the distances between the to-be-categorized items and the prototype were used in the 
model. The other words served only to provide context for the MDS solution.
Parameters were allowed to vary across conditions in exactly the same way as for the 
GCM and all models were fit 100 times, using randomly permuted parameters from the 
best fitting fully constrained model as starting points. For each of the five categories, 
model fit information is given in Table 4.
 The prototype model performed worse than the GCM by a number of measures. 
First, for all three categories in which there are fit measures for both the GCM and 
prototype model, the prototype model provides a worse fit. Second, there is much less 
consistency across the best fitting models. For each parameter in the prototype model, 
at least one category is best fit by allowing it to vary between groups. Finally, the c 
parameter is more difficult to interpret due to its conflation with γ in this model. This 
combination of factors makes the results of the prototype model less informative than the 
results of the exemplar model, even if its structure allows more data to be modeled.
Falsifiability
 An important measure of a model is its falsifiability (Wills & Pothos, 2011). 
A model that can account for any result is overly general and does not do a good job 
of explaining any phenomena. The falsifiability of the GCM was tested by randomly 
reordering the data points across test items and refitting the fully constrained model to 
the resulting data sets. That is, the percentage of in-category responses for Cars might be 
randomly assigned to Elevators, while Cars may get the percentage in-category responses 
Table 4 
Results from Best Fitting Prototype Models
# of Dimensions Best Fitting Model AIC
Carpenters’ Tools 3 Conservative/Avoidance vs. Others - δ 317.8
Clothing 3 Conservative/Avoidance vs. Others - w 131.7
Furniture 3 Approach vs. Avoidance - c 257.3
Vehicles 3 Fully Constrained 452.3
Weapons 5 Conservative/Avoidance vs. Others - δ 320.4
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for Camels. The model fitting proceeded exactly as described before: for each randomly 
ordered data set, the model was fit 100 times, each from a different randomly generated 
starting point. Fits were evaluated with AIC and the best fit of the 100 was retained. 
Results are reported as AIC values averaged across the ten random orders.
 For Clothing, the average AIC of the best fitting models was 1316.3, for Furniture, 
the average AIC of the best fitting models was 1273.7, and for Vehicles, the average 
AIC of the best fitting models was 615.5. All these fits are substantially worse than the 
best fitting models when the data is correctly ordered, indicating that this model can be 
falsified. When 95% of participants say that a bench is a member of Furniture, but only 
15% of participants say that a bed is a member of Furniture, the model cannot fit these 
data. It is interesting to note that the GCM fit the reordered Vehicles better than the 
other two categories. This is likely due to the much more graded nature of the Vehicles 
categorization responses as compared to Clothing or Furniture, where swapping the 
categorization responses would have a more substantial effect.
Discussion
 The GCM provided a very good fit of category membership ratings for a certain 
commonly used natural language categories when supplied with category membership 
data from WordNet and a similarity matrix from LSA. As shown in Figure 8 through 
Figure 10, GCM predictions closely matched participant responses. Additionally, the 
Falsifiability analysis indicated that results are due to a conjunction between participant 
responses, objective measures of category membership and calculated measures of 
concept-to-concept similarity as opposed to the model’s ability to fit any categorization 
pattern.
 Other models tested did not perform better than the GCM. While a prototype 
model allowed for more categorization decisions to be modeled, the fits it provided 
were worse than those provided by the GCM. Both the quantitative measures of fit 
and a qualitative lack of consistency as to which parameter explains between-group 
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variance makes the GCM a more useful model than the prototype model tested here. 
Additionally, a GCM that including frequency information did not improve model fits. 
Perhaps participants were familiar enough with each item presented (excepting go-carts) 
that exemplar frequency does not impact their use in categorization decisions. While 
word frequency is shown to have an effect on the response time of lexical decision tasks 
(Emmanuel et al., 2010), participants performed the lexical decision task under tightly 
controlled timing conditions while participants in Rock and Janoff-Bulmman’s (2010) 
gave untimed responses. Perhaps even a relatively uncommon exemplar will come to 
mind given enough time during a categorization task.
 Since the dimensions relevant to natural language categorization are not known 
a priori and could be infinite (Murphy & Medin, 1985), it is not possible to identify the 
individual dimensions returned by MDS and orient the resulting coordinate points to 
match up with those dimensions. As in other studies in which natural language categories 
have been modeled ( e.g. Dry & Storms, 2009; Vanpaemel et al., 2010; Verbeemen et 
al., 2007; Voorspoels et al., 2008) this is not a concern since the measure of interest is 
how attention is distributed across dimensions rather than which individual dimensions 
participants attended to. One way to allay any remaining concerns is to simulate 
categorization decisions with stimuli of known dimensionality. The GCM could then 
be fit to the simulated data using two different similarity spaces-one with unrotated 
dimensions and one with rotated dimensions. If both results show a similar spread of 
attention across dimensions, the current method is no cause for concern.
 While this experiment has shown that mathematical models can successfully 
handle natural language categories, the results of these models are inconclusive. The 
parameters from the best fitting models of Clothing and Furniture category judgments 
show that Liberals and those in Approach mode are more consistent than Conservatives 
and those in avoidance mode. This presents an alternate interpretation of data that 
indicate that Conservatives in avoidance mode are more exclusive in their categorization: 
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if there is a greater than 50% chance that an item should be a category member, Liberals 
and those in approach mode are more likely to include it. The parameters from the 
best fitting model of Vehicle category judgments, however, indicate the opposite. 
Conservatives in avoidance mode are more consistent than other participants.
 Approach mode has been linked to political liberalism (e.g., Janoff-Bulman et 
al., 2008) which may explain why Liberals are consistent categorizers of Clothing and 
participants in approach mode are consistent categorizers of Furniture. It is surprising, 
however, that Conservatives in avoidance mode appeared to be consistent categorizers 
of Vehicles. Note that these data were analyzed very differently-averaging across 
participants rather than stimuli and selecting out participants-than in Rock and Janoff-
Bulman’s original analysis. Additionally, recall from the Literature Review that there is 
dispute about whether approach mode broadens cognition relative to avoidance mode 
(Friedman & Förster, 2005) or if an extreme mode in either direction narrows cognition 
(P. A. Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008; P. Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010; Price & Harmon-
Jones, 2010).
 It is noteworthy that Vehicles showed a much more graded category membership 
profile than either Clothing or Furniture. This may be due to the nature of the categories, 
although graded membership is typically found in all categories, especially man-made 
artifacts (McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978; Verheyen, Heussen, & Storms, 2011). On the 
other hand, it may be due to the method for selecting stimuli for the experiment. Rock 
and Janoff-Bulman tried to select items with a range of typicality, as judged by data 
collected in Rosch in 1975. It is possible that items (such as ash-trays) have significantly 
changed their typicality in the last 35 years, and these data are no longer useful for 
selecting stimuli. New typicality data for Furniture and Vehicles will be collected in a 
pilot study of Experiment 3.
 Experiment 3 will extend these results by collecting category judgment decisions 
for Rosch’s full lists of Furniture and Vehicles. Collecting a larger list of potential 
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category members will assure a full range of category typicality (that is, items that 
are clearly in the category, items that are clearly not in the category, and items that 
are in-between). It will also provide many more degrees of freedom for each model, 
since increasing the number of data points predicted does not increase the number of 
parameters required by the model. Furthermore, item presentation will be computerized, 
allowing for response time data to be collected and both modeled with the EBRW. The 
techniques shown to best work for the GCM in Experiment 2 will be directly applied to 
the EBRW in Experiment 3.
 The techniques tested by modeling Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s data proved to be 
successful in accounting for categorization performance. The results of these analyses, 
however, should not be seen as a refutation of Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s results. In this 
analysis responses were combined across participants (as opposed to across items, as in 
the original analyses) and many participants were removed from the analysis to reduce 
the modeling computations. The main goal of these analyses was to determine the best 
method for fitting exemplar-based models of categorization to natural language data 
when looking for between-group differences so that this method can be applied to data 
collected in Experiment 3. Using one set of data to establish a model and method and 
then applying that model to a second set of data helps assure that the model is fitting the 
signal of the data and not the noise.
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CHAPTER 6 
EXPERIMENT 3
 Experiment 3 is a partial replication and extension of Rock & Janoff-Bulman 
(2010). In Experiment 3, Liberal and Conservative participants in approach and 
avoidance mode make categorization decisions for Clothing and an extended list of 
Furniture and Vehicles while using a computerized method that allows for the collection 
of response times. First, this extension increases the data point to parameter ratio, 
providing more confidence in model results. Second, the collection of response times 
allows for the EBRW to be fit to these data. The EBRW will be used to account for the 
between-group differences. The EBRW may provide a better analog than the GCM for 
the differences in cognition observed between people in approach and avoidance mode. 
 In addition to the main study, a norming study was conducted to collect typicality 
and familiarity measures of the Furniture and Vehicles stimuli. Since Rosch (1975) 
generated these lists more than 35 years ago, some items may have become more or 
less typical in the intervening years or have become unfamiliar altogether. For example, 
consider the disappearance of television cabinets over the past decade due to the 
popularity of plasma televisions.
Method
Participants
 Experiment 3 was run concurrently with Experiment 1 and participants were 
recruited through the same methods (see Experiment 1 for details). Participants self-
selected to participate in Experiment 1 or in this experiment, and received one extra-
credit point for participating. Over three semesters, 118 University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst students participated in Experiment 3 (32 Males and 86 Females). Of these 
118 participants, 64 were Liberals and 54 were Conservatives. 22 Liberals and 17 
Conservatives were in the Approach condition, 21 Liberals and 19 Conservatives were 
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in the Neutral condition, and 20 Liberals and 19 Conservatives were in the Avoidance 
condition. One participant was not included in analyses due to computer error.
 The norming study examining familiarity and typicality of the stimuli had 49 
participants, drawn from the psychology department subject pool in the Fall of 2011. 
There was no political orientation requirement to participate in the norming study. 
Furthermore, none of the participants in who participated in the norming study also 
participated in Experiment 1 or Experiment 3. Of these participants, 39 were Females and 
10 were Males.
Materials
 As previously mentioned, all categorization stimuli originated from Rosch (1975). 
The category of Clothing was used as a practice set and the twelve-item subset tested by 
Rock & Janoff-Bulman (2010) were used in the present study. For Vehicles and Furniture, 
all items from Rosch’s list were used. All stimuli were presented on an eMac running the 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner, Brainard, & Pelli, 2007; Pelli, 1997). 
For the norming study, only the Vehicles and Furniture lists were tested.
Procedure
 Experiment 3 had three phases: approach/avoidance induction, categorization, 
and manipulation check. After reading and signing the consent form, participants sat 
at a computer in an isolated room and performed the approach/avoidance induction as 
described in Experiment 1. Participants in the approach condition were asked to list 10 
movies to watch for a good time, participants in the avoidance condition were asked to 
list 10 movies to not watch to avoid a bad time, and participants in the neutral condition 
were asked to list 10 movies they had watched recently. All participants were given a 
maximum of 5 minutes to complete this stage.
 After listing movies, participants were asked to make a series of categorization 
decisions. Each participant started with twelve Clothing categorization decisions in 
order to familiarize them with the response format (since response time is critical to the 
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EBRW). On each trial, participants were shown an item (e.g., “shirt,” “sweater,” “ring”) 
and asked whether it was a member of the category “Clothing.”  If participants believed 
that a given item was in the category, they pressed the key “f,” otherwise they pressed the 
key “j.”  The presentation order of the twelve Clothing items was randomized for each 
participant. After categorizing Clothing, participants were asked to make categorization 
decisions about Vehicles and Furniture. Both the order of category presentation and the 
order of item presentation were randomized across participants.
 After making categorization decisions for all three sets of stimuli, participants 
performed the manipulation check as described in Experiment 1. They were asked to 
list three goals that they hoped to accomplish and three goals that they felt obligated to 
accomplish. Response times to the former are believed to reflect the extent of approach 
mode activation while response times to the later are believed to reflect the extent 
of avoidance mode activation. The order of presentation of the two goals sets was 
randomized across participants.
 Participants in the norming study were shown the same lists of Furniture and 
Vehicles as participants in Experiment 3. Instead of making categorization decisions for 
each item, however, participants were asked to judge their familiarity with each item as 
well as the item’s typicality as a member of its category. Each judgment was made on 
a scale of 1 to 9, where 1 meant Not Familiar or Highly Atypical and 9 meant Highly 
Familiar or Highly Typical. Participants were encouraged to use the whole range of 
responses.
Results
Norming Study
 The norming study aimed to answer two questions. First, how familiar were 
participants with the natural language category members used as stimuli in this study? 
Average familiarity ratings are listed in Appendix Table F8 and Table F9. Overall, 
participants were very familiar with the stimuli in the study. On a scale of 1 (Not 
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Familiar) to 9 (Very Familiar), the Furniture stimuli had a median familiarity rating of 
8.79, IQR = 0.76 and the Vehicles stimuli had a median familiarity of 8.55, IQR = 0.72. 
Items rated as unfamiliar were excluded from further analyses. Since both familiarity 
distributions were highly negatively skewed, outliers were identified with the 1.5×IQR 
method. For Furniture, this led to the exclusion of Davenport, Divan, Cedar Chest, Chaise 
Lounge, Hassock and Hi-Fi. This method did not lead to the exclusion of any Vehicles
 The second question addressed by the norming study was how contemporary 
participants ranked the typicality of these stimuli as members of their natural language 
categories. Average typicality ratings are listed in Appendix Table F8 and Table F9. 
While Rosch (1975) had collected this data thirty-seven years ago, it was possible that 
the typicality of some of these items had changed as the culture has evolved. Overall, 
correlation was very high for Vehicles (r = -0.93) and high for Furniture (r = -0.72). 
When unfamiliar items are removed from Furniture, correlation increased to r = -0.86. 
Manipulation Check
 As in Experiment 1, the measure of interest for the manipulation check was 
the amount of time participants required before coming up with each of the three 
goals they aspired to accomplish and each of the three goals they were required to 
accomplish (Friedman & Förster, 2001). This was quantified by the average amount of 
time participants required before they started typing each of their answers. Differences 
in the time to start typing were tested by a 3(Mode) × 2(Question Type) mixed model 
ANOVA, with Question Type as a within-subjects factor. First, there was a main effect 
of Question Type. Participants were faster to start typing goals that they aspired to 
achieve (x =  6.12, s = 4.24) than goals that they were required to achieve (x =  10.39, 
s = 8.36), F(1,114) = 33.70, p < .001 . There was, however, neither a main effect of 
Mode (F(1,114) = 0.35, p = .70) nor an interaction between Mode and Question Type 
(F(2,116) = 0.64, p = .53).
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Categorization Performance
 The goal of the present analyses is to identify between-group differences in 
categorization decisions as reported by Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010). One participant 
was removed from further analyses for answering “in-the-category” to 56 of 58 Furniture, 
45 of 47 Vehicles and averaging 0.23 seconds per answer for Furniture. Average “in-the-
category” rates are given in Table 5. Complete “in-the-category” rates are provided for 
each item in the Appendix Table F8 and Table F9.
 In Experiment 3, participants were selected for their political identity and this 
variable must therefore be treated as categorical. The inclusion of many category 
items, however, means that typicality can now be treated as a continuous variable. 
Categorization decisions were analyzed through a logistic regression, with Subject, Item 
Typicality (as measured by the norming study), Mode (Approach, Neutral, Avoidance), 
Political Identity (Liberal vs. Conservative), and their interactions entered as predictors of 
category inclusion. The addition of these predictors significantly improved the predictions 
of the model over a constant-only model from 59.3% correct to 77.7% correct, 
χ2(12) = 4884.24, p < .001. The results of this test are given in Table 6.
Table 5 
Average “In-the-category” Rates for Experiment 3
Condition x s
Liberals
  Approach .60 .11
  Neutral .56 .09
  Avoidance .61 .09
Conservatives
  Approach .54 .08
  Neutral .58 .14
  Avoidance .65 .08
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 In this analysis, all groups were compared to Liberals in approach mode. The 
categorization rates predicted by the logistic regression are illustrated in Figure 11. 
For Liberals in approach mode, each unit increase in Typicality increased the odds of 
including an item in a given category (Source 2). For example, the regression equation 
predicts that Liberals in approach mode will make an “in-the-category” judgment for 
benches (typicality = 7.32) 89.6% of the time, pianos (typicality = 4.83) 56.8% of the 
time, and sewing machines (typicality = 2.60) 19.6% of the time. 
 For Liberals in avoidance mode, there was an overall decrease in the odds of 
including an item in a given category relative to Liberals in approach mode (Source 
4), but this difference decreases as Typicality increases (Source 7). According to the 
regression equation, Liberals in avoidance mode would make an “in-the-category” 
judgment to benches 89.6% of the time, pianos 48.9% of the time and sewing machines 
11.8% of the time. Note that for items of high typicality, the response probability is the 
same but for items of lower typicality the probability is lower.
Table 6 
Logistic Regression for Experiment 3
Source B SE Wald df p odds
1. Constant -3.37 0.18 345.06 1 < .001 0.03
2. Typicality 0.76 0.04 475.35 1 < .001 2.13
3. Subjects 0.00 0.01 0.01 1 .92 1.00
4. Mode 1 -0.93 0.27 12.13 1 < .001 0.40
5. Mode 2 -1.02 0.27 14.73 1 < .001 0.36
6. Politics -0.66 0.27 5.99 1 < .05 0.52
7. Mode 1 × Typicality 0.13 0.05 5.92 1 < .05 1.13
8. Mode 2 × Typicality 0.14 0.05 7.54 1 < .01 1.15
9. Politics × Typicality 0.04 0.05 0.60 1 .44 1.04
10. Mode 1 × Politics 1.15 0.39 8.77 1 < .01 3.17
11. Mode 2 × Politics 1.34 0.38 12.14 1 < .001 3.81
12. Mode 1 × Politics × Typicality -0.08 0.08 1.11 1 .29 0.92
13. Mode 2 × Politics  × Typicality -0.16 0.07 4.96 1 < .05 0.85
Note: Mode 1 is Approach = 0, Avoidance = 1, Mode 2 is Approach = 0, Neutral = 1. Politics is 
Liberal = 0, Conservative = 1.
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 For Conservatives in approach mode, there was also an overall decrease in the 
odds of including an item in a given category relative to Liberals in approach mode 
(Source 6) and this decrease remains for all levels of Typicality (Source 9). According 
to the regression equation, Conservatives in approach mode would make an “in-the-
category” judgment to benches 85.7% of the time, pianos 45.2% of the time and sewing 
machines 12.3% of the time. Notice how the difference between Liberals in approach 
mode and Conservatives in approach mode continues through the whole range of 
typicality.
 Finally, for Conservatives in avoidance mode, there was a smaller decrease in the 
odds of including an item in the category relative to Liberals in approach mode (Sources 
4, 6 and 10) than was found for Conservatives in approach mode (Source 6) or Liberals 
in avoidance mode (Source 4). The difference in inclusion between Conservatives in 
Figure 11: Experiment 3 categorization rates by typicality as predicted by the logistic 
regression
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avoidance mode and Liberals in approach mode decreases and eventually the effect 
reverses as typicality increases (Sources 7 and 12). According to the regression equation, 
Conservatives in avoidance mode would make an “in-the-category” judgment to benches 
91.3% of the time, pianos 56.4% of the time and sewing machines 16.5% of the time. 
Notice how Conservatives in avoidance mode are predicted to have a higher percentage 
of “in-the-category” responses than Liberals in approach mode and this difference only 
reverses at the lower levels of typicality.
Modeling
 Participants’ categorization responses and response times were averaged within 
Mode, Political Identity and category type (Furniture or Vehicles). Each was fit with the 
EBRW. As with the GCM in Experiment 2, this required establishing a similarity space, 
approximating category membership, and determining a set of exemplars to populate the 
space.
Populating the Model with Exemplars
 Unlike Experiment 2, participants in Experiment 3 made categorization decisions 
for every natural language category member on Rosch’s (1975) Vehicles and Furniture 
list. Therefore, no additional category members were added to the model to flesh out the 
exemplar list. Similar to Experiment 2, however, up to three words associated with each 
natural language category member were included as exemplars. Again, these associated 
words were taken from the University of South Florida Word Association database 
(Nelson et al., 1998). The full list of associated words can be seen in Appendix E.
Approximating Category Membership
 As in Experiment 2, category membership was determined with WordNet 
(Princeton University, 2010). Exemplars whose definition or taxonomy contained 
the natural language category were considered to be category members for modeling 
purposes.
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Determining Similarity Space
 Experiment 3 used the same methods for determining a similarity space as 
Experiment 2. First, overall similarity was calculated by inputting all exemplars into 
LSA. The resulting similarity matrix was converted to distances with MDS. Nineteen 
MDS solutions were constructed, having between 2 and 20 dimensions. The optimal 
number of dimensions in the MDS solution was determined by correlating a constructed 
typicality rating for each solution and the typicality ratings collected by Rosch (1975). 
The optimal number of dimensions was identified by the “elbow” in the correlations, 
where adding more dimensions did not significantly increase the correlation. See 
Appendix Figure D2 for graphs of the MDS results. For both Furniture and Vehicles, the 
optimal MDS solution had 10 dimensions. It is likely that these differ from the optimal 
number of dimensions in Experiment 2 due to the increased number of exemplars used in 
Experiment 3.
Generating the Data
 Similarly to Experiment 2, data was averaged across participants within a Political 
Identity, mode condition and category in order to generate proportional categorization 
data. As there were no hypotheses about participants in the Neutral Mode condition, these 
participants were excluded from the modeling analyses. Therefore, four data sets for were 
generated for each category: Liberals in approach mode, Liberals in avoidance mode, 
Conservatives in approach mode, and Conservatives in avoidance mode.
Fitting the EBRW
 For each category, a fully constrained version of the EBRW was fit to all four 
data sets. This model found the c, the set of w parameters, the A and B boundaries, and 
the time parameters (α, k  and μ) that best minimized the WSSD. This model was run 
100 times with random starting points to guard against local minima, and the parameter 
from the best fitting model were kept. Next, this model was run again 100 times with the 
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best fitting parameters as its starting point, each permuted by normally distributed noise 
(N(0,1)).
 The next step in model fitting was to allow parameters to vary between groups. 
The data were fit with models that allowed either c, all w weights, A, B or both A and B to 
vary between groups. As in Experiment 2, parameters were allowed to vary one of three 
ways: between Liberals and Conservatives, participants in Approach mode and Avoidance 
mode, and Conservatives in Avoidance mode compared to all others. Because the logistic 
regression analysis of the categorization performance showed that Liberals in approach 
mode were the most inclusive categorizers, additional models were fit that allowed 
these parameters to vary between Liberals in approach mode and all other participants. 
Therefore, a total of 21 models were fit to account for between-group differences. Each 
was fit 100 times using the best fitting parameters of the fully constrained model plus 
normally distributed noise as starting points. The predictions of the best fitting models 
can be found in the Appendix Table F10 and Table F11.
 In Experiment 2, models were compared using AIC (Burnham & Anderson, 2002), 
a theoretically motivated method of accounting for differences in model complexity using 
log likelihood as a fit measure. Since the EBRW has no known likelihood fit measure 
(Nosofsky & Stanton, 2005), models in Experiment 3 were compared with cross-
validation (Browne, 2000). Cross-validation fits the model to one set of data and tests it 
on another. It is based on the assumption that a model that is too complex will fit noise in 
the data and do a poor job of predicting new data. Cross-validation was implemented by 
cycling through each to-be-categorized item, fitting each of the models with that item’s 
categorization and RT data withheld, and then using the resulting parameters to predict 
the withheld data. Each model’s cross-validation fit measure is the average of its WSSD 
across all predicted data points.
 The best fitting parameters for each of these models are given in the Appendix 
Table F10 and Table F11. For Furniture, the best fitting model allowed A to vary between 
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Conservatives in avoidance mode and all other participants. For participant categorization 
decisions, and the best fitting model predictions, see Figure 12. For participant RT and 
the best fitting model predictions, see Figure 13. In this best fitting model, A
ConAvo
 was 
0.94 while A
Other
 was 1.04, indicating that Conservatives in avoidance mode required less 
information to make an “in-the-category” decision and were less consistent. 
 For Vehicles, the best fitting model allowed both A and B to vary between Liberals 
and Conservatives. For participant categorization decisions and the best fitting model 
predictions, see Figure 14. For participants RT and the best fitting model predictions, see 
Figure 15. In this best fitting model, A
Lib
 was 21.44 and A
Con
 was 23.09, while B
Lib
 was 
32.05 and B
Con
 was 29.51. Here, Liberals required less information than Conservatives 
in order to make an “in-the-category” decision and more information than Conservatives 
in order to make an “out-of-the-category” decision. Additionally, this places the A and B 
farther apart for Liberals than Conservatives, indicating that there was more consistency 
between Liberals than Conservatives in their categorization decisions.
Discussion
 Experiment 3 showed between-group differences between Liberals and 
Conservatives in approach and avoidance modes when categorizing Furniture and 
Vehicles. When grouped across category, Liberals in approach mode showed higher 
levels of category inclusion relative to Liberals in avoidance mode and Conservatives 
in approach mode. Conservatives in avoidance mode, however, were similar in their 
inclusivity to Liberals in approach mode. These differences were most notable at lower 
levels of category typicality. When each category was modeled separately, the best 
fitting model of Furniture allowed Conservatives in avoidance mode to have a smaller A 
parameter than other participants and the best fitting model of Vehicles allowed Liberals 
to have a smaller A parameter and a larger B parameter than Conservatives. While the 
manipulation check did not find significant differences between participants in approach 
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and avoidance modes, between-group differences in inferential statistics and model 
results indicate that the manipulation was effective.
 To the extent that cognitive differences between people with different political 
identities are due to personality differences, with Liberals more inclined to approach 
state and Conservatives more inclined to avoidance state (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008), 
these results are most in line with the findings of Markman et al. (Markman et al., 2005). 
They found that decision boundaries are impacted by approach and avoidance state when 
learning a new category. For both categories in Experiment 3, between-group differences 
were best accounted for by changes in the decision criteria—how  much information was 
required before a categorization decision was made. 
 Even though both categories were best fit with between-group differences in 
decision criteria, the group with the most inclusive criterion depended on the category 
being modeled. That is, Furniture was best fit by a model allowing Conservatives in 
avoidance mode had a smaller A than other participants, while Vehicles were best fit by 
a model allowing Liberals to have a smaller A and a larger B than Conservatives. This 
surprising result can be addressed by looking at the parameters of non-winning models. 
For Furniture, look at the model that allowed the A and B parameters to vary between 
Liberals in approach mode and all other participants. Liberals in approach mode were 
best fit with a smaller A and a larger B, the same as their categorization decisions for 
Vehicles. Now look at the Vehicles model that allowed the A and B parameters to vary 
between Conservatives in avoidance mode and all other participants. Here, Conservatives 
had a smaller A and an identical B, the same as their categorization decisions for 
Furniture. This indicates that when Conservatives in avoidance mode are more inclusive 
categorizers, they are also less consistent categorizers.
 In sum, it seems like for both Furniture and Vehicles, Liberals in approach 
mode and Conservatives in avoidance mode were the most inclusive categorizers. Since 
Liberals are more likely to be in approach mode and Conservatives are more likely to be 
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in Avoidance mode (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008), perhaps participants in both of these 
conditions were more receptive to their manipulation and were placed in a more extreme 
mode. Price and Harmon-Jones (Price & Harmon-Jones, 2010) refer to this as “high 
motivational intensity” and found related effects with approach motivation: that within a 
given mode, “low motivational intensity” and “high motivational intensity” have different 
effects on cognitive abilities. In contrast to the current results, however, they found that 
high motivational intensity led to more exclusive categorization.
 While the models overall did a good job of predicting participants’ categorization 
decisions, some predictions were notably incorrect. Often this was due to a basic 
disagreement between participants and WordNet (Princeton University, 2010) about 
category membership. For example, while participants claimed to be familiar with a 
buffet, obviously few were familiar with it as a piece of furniture and the model could not 
accommodate giving a piece of furniture such a low probability of being in the category. 
Additionally, the University of South Florida Free Association Norms (Nelson et al., 
1998) did not provide any associations for “buffet,” which would likely have been food 
and have brought down the models association between Buffets and other exemplars of 
Furniture.
 As can be judged by the fit values in Appendix Table F10, the models of 
Vehicles fit worse than the models of Furniture. The two items with the worst fit were 
Ambulance and Skateboard. Ambulance was an odd instance. Almost all participants 
thought an Ambulance was a Vehicle and WordNet agreed. Ambulance’s two closest 
associations (other than self-similarity) were wheelchair and truck stop. These were both 
not considered to be Vehicles by WordNet and these associations reduced the predicted 
category inclusion rate to 73% for Liberals and 83% for Conservatives. Note that while 
these values may not have the largest absolute error , they have the largest weighted 
error because they have little variability according to the binomial distribution with an 
observed category inclusion rate close to 100%.
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 Skateboard had problems similar to Buffet in that there was a disagreement 
between WordNet and participants. Inclusion rates ranged from 15% for Liberals in 
avoidance mode to 38% for Liberals in approach mode. WordNet, however, indicates 
that a skateboard is a vehicle. After its self-similarity, Skateboard was about equally 
similar to Movie and Bike. Movies are not considered Vehicles by WordNet and Bikes 
are considered Vehicles, so these exemplars likely canceled out each other in terms of 
category inclusion. The model therefore predicts that Skateboards will be included in the 
category 83% of the time for Liberals and 80% of the time for Conservatives.
 It is unclear what the best step is to improve model fits. In a number of instances, 
a fundamental disagreement between participants and WordNet regarding category 
membership causes the model to make poor predictions. While an item’s WordNet 
category membership is obviously not the only component of the categorization decision, 
it is a large factor because an item’s self-similarity always has the most influence on the 
model’s prediction. One way to reduce the impact of WordNet’s category membership for 
the to-be-categorized item is to manually reduce self-similarity. Highly typical category 
members will remain similar to other category members, keeping their predicted category 
inclusion rates high. Atypical members would not be similar to other category members 
and this would drive down their category inclusion rates. This would help the fits for 
items like Buffet and Skateboard, but not for items like Ambulance.
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CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
 The purpose of the dissertation was to use exemplar-based models of 
categorization to explain the between-group differences observed by Rock and Janoff-
Bulman’s (2010). Experiment 1 the EBRW was fit to the categorization decisions 
of Conservative and Liberal participants in approach and avoidance modes using 
experimenter-designed stimuli. The stimuli in Experiment 1 had clearly defined 
dimensions that could be easily accounted for by mathematical models of categorization. 
In Experiment 2 the GCM was fit to the data from Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010) 
Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, the EBRW was fit to data that replicated Rock and 
Janoff-Bulman’s (2010) for two categories and extended it by collecting RTs and adding 
stimuli to each of the two categories.
The Effect of Mode and Political Identity
 Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010) showed that when participants were put into 
avoidance mode, the most politically conservative participants were the most exclusive 
categorizers of natural language stimuli. Approach mode had no significant effect on the 
inclusivity of participants who made categorization decisions about natural language 
stimuli. Based on these results, one would expect that Conservatives in avoidance mode 
would be the most exclusive categorizers of artificial stimuli in Experiment 1 and of 
natural language categories in Experiment 3.
 In Experiment 1, Liberals and Conservatives were placed into approach or 
avoidance mode while deciding whether artificial stimuli were members of a newly 
learned category. Experiment 1 showed that Liberals were more inclusive categorizers 
than Conservatives when making decisions about these artificial stimuli. Specifically, 
an ANOVA showed more inclusive categorization for Liberals in approach mode than 
Conservatives in approach mode, while a Signal Detection analysis showed that Liberals 
in avoidance mode had a more inclusive criterion than Conservatives in avoidance mode. 
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In Experiment 3, Liberals and Conservatives were placed into approach or avoidance 
mode while deciding whether natural language stimuli were members of natural language 
categories. Experiment 3 showed that Liberals in approach mode were the most inclusive 
categorizers of these natural language stimuli, followed closely by Conservatives in 
avoidance mode. At high levels of category typicality Conservatives in avoidance mode 
became more inclusive categorizers of these natural language stimuli than Liberals in 
approach mode. These results are surprising. Based on Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010), 
one would expect that  Conservatives in avoidance mode would be the most exclusive 
categorizers in both studies.
 In sum, the results of the behavioral data are inconsistent across experiments. 
Overall, Liberals appear more inclusive categorizers than Conservatives in Experiment 
1, while both Liberals in approach mode and Conservatives in avoidance mode were 
highly inclusive categorizers in Experiment 3. As discussed throughout this dissertation, 
inclusive categorization can come about through differences in a number of components 
of the categorization process. Differences in these components could produce different 
effects depending on the stimuli. If the observed between-group differences were due 
to differences in consistency of categorization, then the apparent inclusivity of their 
categorization would be dependent on the typicality of the items being categorized. In 
Experiment 1, the majority of the jellyfish (8 of 13) were clearly category members. 
Under these circumstances a more consistent categorizer would appear to be a more 
inclusive categorizer – more consistently including all of the typical category members. 
In Experiment 3, there was a greater range of typicality within each category and under 
these conditions being a consistent categorizer might not appear to be an inclusive 
categorizer. On the other hand, if being a Liberal or being in approach mode broadened 
a categorizer’s spread of attention across dimensions, this may make them more likely 
to include atypical jellyfish since these jellyfish are unlikely to be atypical across all 
dimensions due to their creation process. Again, the effect of focused attention is harder 
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to predict for natural language categories. Perhaps focusing on dimension such as “does 
it carry people” for Vehicles or “can you buy it in a Furniture store” for Furniture may 
make people with focused attention appear to be more inclusive categorizers.
 To address these issues, Experiment 2 used the GCM to model data from Rock 
and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010) Experiment 1, in which Liberals and Conservatives were 
placed into approach or avoidance mode while deciding whether natural language stimuli 
were members of natural language categories. Each of the three categories modeled 
indicated that differences in inclusiveness between groups were due to differences in 
γ, a parameter representing the consistency of responses to items of uncertain category 
membership. Participants in approach mode had a higher γ than participants in avoidance 
mode when categorizing Clothing, Liberal participants had a higher γ than Conservatives 
when categorizing Furniture, and Conservative participants in avoidance mode had a 
higher γ than all other participants when categorizing Vehicles.
 Experiments 1 and 3 used the EBRW, which does not have a γ parameter, to 
model the data. The distance between the A and B parameters in the EBRW would be 
roughly analogous to γ in the GCM. Increasing the distance between A and B effectively 
increases the number of exemplars sampled before a decision is made and decreases 
the chance that the decision will be impacted by an improbable sampling of exemplars 
from the less-likely category. Therefore, a large distance between A and B means that 
the model predicts a consistent categorization decision of the most likely category 
membership. The absolute values of A and B determine the model’s inclusiveness. As A 
moves closer or B moves farther away from the zero-knowledge point, the model predicts 
more inclusive categorization.
 Experiment 1 showed that Conservatives in avoidance mode had a larger c 
parameter than all other participants. This indicates that Conservatives in avoidance mode 
required items had to be a closer match to trained category members before they judged 
them to be category members. Experiment 3 showed that Conservatives in avoidance 
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mode had a smaller A parameter than all other participants when categorizing Furniture. 
This indicates that Conservatives in avoidance mode were more inclusive but less 
consistent categorizers than all other participants. Experiment 3 also showed that Liberals 
had a smaller A parameter and a larger B parameter than Conservatives when categorizing 
Vehicles. This indicates that Liberals were more inclusive than Conservatives. Liberals 
were also the more consistent categorizers, since the distance between A and B is greater 
for Liberals than Conservatives, indicating that Liberals required more information than 
Conservatives in order to reach a decision.
 The exemplar-based models of categorization fit in Experiments 2 and 3 
identified between-group differences as originating in the A and B parameters or the γ 
parameter. These parameters are all associated with the decision-making components of 
the categorization process. That is, they determine how people turn an item’s similarity 
to a set of exemplars into a categorization decision, rather than how they scale the 
similarity between exemplars. These results are consistent with those of Markman et 
al. (2005), who found that being in different modes during a category learning task 
affected how participants established their decision boundaries. Modeling results for 
Experiment 1, however, identified between-group differences as originating in the c 
parameter, which is associated with the item-to-exemplar comparison component of 
categorization. It is possible that the nature of the stimuli interact with the observed effect 
of the categorization process. That is, approach and avoidance mode could impact the 
perception of items learned in the laboratory, while at the same time impacting decision 
making about previously known items.
 Previous attempts to account for the effects of context on categorization have 
focused on how people spread attention across dimensions ( e.g., Lin & Murphy, 1997; 
Spalding & Murphy, 1996). The modeling results presented here indicate that researchers 
should extend their investigations beyond how attention is distributed across dimensions 
to look at other aspects of the categorization process, such as the amount of information 
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required to make a categorization decision and the impact of context on the consistency 
of categorization responses. For example, Lamberts (1995; 1998) has shown that making 
categorization decisions under a time-constraint affects how information accumulates. 
There may be between-group differences in this effect. Other types of ephemeral and 
persistent contexts may also affect decision criteria.
 Different analyses—ANOVA, Signal Detection, and modeling—of data from 
Experiments 1 and 3 yielded different results about whether the manipulations were 
successful. For reasons explained in the Discussion of each experiment, these different 
results indicate that the manipulation check used was not sufficiently sensitive to 
differences between participants in approach mode and participants in avoidance mode. 
Shortly after the current experiments were designed, a line-bisection task was proposed 
as an alternate manipulation check and shown to correlate with neuropsychological 
evidence associated with differences in mode (Nash, McGregor, & Inzlicht, 2010). Future 
experiments may benefit from including multiple manipulation checks that have been 
shown to be sensitive to approach/avoidance mode manipulation, such as line-bisection.
Modeling Natural Language Categories
 Previous attempts to model natural language categories have used subjective 
measures of generating a similarity space and have not investigated between-group 
differences (e.g., Smits et al., 2002; Voorspoels et al., 2008). The present methods 
were designed to develop a more objective way of fitting exemplar-based models of 
categorization to natural language categories than has previously been used, allowing 
them to account for between-group differences in categorization decisions. Three major 
challenges needed to be overcome: defining a similarity space, determining category 
membership for exemplars, and populating the similarity space. In Experiments 2 and 
3, LSA (Landauer et al., 1998) was used to define the similarity space of the natural 
language categories, WordNet (Princeton University, 2010) was used to define category 
membership of exemplars, and the University of South Florida Word Association 
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database (Nelson et al., 1998) was used to populate the similarity space of the natural 
language categories with exemplars. These methods provided a successful framework for 
modeling between-group differences in natural language categorization.
 Future attempts to fit exemplar-based models to natural language categories 
could use other methods. For example, similarity metrics based on WordNet taxonomies 
could be used to define the similarity space of natural language categories rather than 
LSA (for a discussion of these metrics, see Budanitsky & Hirst, 2006). Unlike LSA, in 
which words are defined by the context in which they are found, WordNet uses synonyms 
to define words. WordNet therefore distinguishes between the various meanings of 
polysemous words where LSA does not. For example, in WordNet the Buffet of dining 
room furniture is unrelated to the Buffet of self-service restaurants, so concepts similar 
to Buffet
Restaurant
 will not affect the similarity calculations of Buffet
Furniture
. This may have 
a positive or a negative impact for modeling categorization decisions, depending on 
whether homonyms and associated words impact the categorization decision.
 Items from the University of South Florida Word Association database (Nelson 
et al., 1998) were included as exemplars in the similarity space of a to-be-categorized 
item only if those items were of the same taxonomic level as the to-be-categorized item 
in Experiments 2 and 3. For example, drawers and wood were not included as exemplars 
in the similarity space when modeling participants’ decisions about whether a desk is 
Furniture even though these two items are associated with desks in the database. Model 
fits might be improved by including items as exemplars regardless of their taxonomic 
level. Sometimes items from different taxonomic levels that are associated with an 
item appear in an exemplar-based model as features that the item has in common with 
exemplars of a category. For example, a desk can be similar to exemplars of Furniture, 
like chairs and tables, because they are all made of wood. If these features were 
exemplars themselves, their category membership would need to be determined. The 
WordNet definition of wood does not mention Furniture, so the exemplar wood would 
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not be included in the category Furniture if WordNet is used to define the category 
membership of exemplars. The EBRW would then lower the probability that a desk 
would be included in the category Furniture based on its similarity to wood. On the other 
hand, the WordNet definition of drawers does mention Furniture, so the exemplar drawers 
would be included in the category Furniture. The EBRW would then raise the probability 
that a desk would be included in the category Furniture based on its similarity to drawers.
 Future efforts to model natural language categorization decisions could benefit 
from trying to estimate parameter values from other measures. For example, bias could be 
estimated by a signal detection task unrelated to the categorization decision. This estimate 
could stand in for the distance between the A and B boundaries, so only one parameter 
would have to be fit to the data. Similarly, the score from a recognition memory test could 
be used to estimate the c parameter. Estimating these parameters from other sources 
would have two benefits. First, it would increase the meaningfulness of the model by 
showing that the parameters reflect measureable psychological processes. Second, from 
a modeling standpoint, it would decrease the complexity of the model and reduce the 
likelihood that the model is fitting noise in the data rather than true underlying behavior.
Conclusion
 In conclusion, the present studies identified differences in the categorization 
decisions of Liberals and Conservatives in approach and avoidance modes, but these 
differences were inconsistent across studies and categories. These categorization 
decisions were fit with exemplar-based models of categorization. To do so required 
developing objective methods of generating model components. Liberals and those in 
approach mode may have a more inclusive category criterion but are most likely more 
consistent categorizers compared to Conservatives and those in avoidance mode. The 
effect of differences in consistency on category inclusiveness, however, depend on the 
category structure being tested.
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APPENDIX A 
PRE-SCREENING SURVEY QUESTIONS
1. Where would you place yourself politically on the following two scales?
 a. 1 (very liberal) – 4 (neither) – 7 (very conservative)
 b. 1 (strong Democrat) – 4 (neither) – 7 (strong Republican)
2. How much do you tend to like or dislike political conservatives?
 a. 1(dislike extremely) – 7 (like extremely)
3. How much do you tend to like or dislike political liberals?
 a. 1(dislike extremely) – 7 (like extremely)
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APPENDIX B 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR APPROACH/AVOIDANCE MANIPULATION IN 
EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 3
 1. Approach: We are interested in finding movies that are generally considered fun 
to watch. Please list 10 movies you would recommend a friend TO SEE if they wanted to 
have a good time.
 2. Neutral: We are interested in finding movies that are generally well known. 
Please list 10 movies that you have seen recently.
 3. Avoidance: We are interested in finding movies that are generally considered 
unpleasant to watch. Please list 10 movies you would recommend a friend NOT TO SEE 
if they wanted prevent a bad time.
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APPENDIX C 
STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT 1
Table C1. 
Stimuli Generation Values for Experiment 1
Stimulus Space Category Prototype Values
Dimensions Min Max Mean SD
Organ color (rgb = [x 0 0]) 85 205 145 7.5
Bell diameter (400x by 200x pixels) .6 1.5 1.05 .05
Bell thickness (line = x pt weight) 1 11.8 6.45 .6
Tentacle length (segment = x pixels) 16 34 25 1
Table C2. 
Stimuli Values for Experiment 1
Organ Color Bell Diameter Bell Thickness Tentacle Length
High 1 0.99 24.90 6.68 133.92
High 2 1.03 26.43 7.10 149.54
High 3 1.16 25.29 5.85 145.24
Medium 1 1.07 23.44 6.72 149.82
Medium 2 1.11 24.51 6.29 143.42
Medium 3 1.05 25.76 5.49 138.99
Atypical 1 1.10 26.68 3.34 149.61
Atypical 2 1.00 23.89 7.17 123.07
Atypical 3 1.13 23.83 7.04 142.03
Non-category 1 0.90 30.59 2.32 204.88
Non-category 2 0.89 16.94 7.85 153.59
Non-category 3 1.14 22.51 2.65 123.53
Non-category 4 0.65 25.23 6.51 94.37
Non-category 5 0.75 29.26 6.80 159.42
Non-category 6 1.48 16.58 6.30 132.58
Non-category 7 1.26 25.79 6.17 88.19
Note. Stimuli in boldface were used during training
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APPENDIX E 
WORD ASSOCIATIONS FOR NATURAL LANGUAGE CATEGORY MODELING
Experiment 2
Carpenter’s Tools
1. Drill
 a. Hole
 b. Teeth
2. Ladder
 a. Roof
 b. Stair
 c. Paint
3. Bolt
 a. Door
4. Saw
 a. Tree
5. Rag
 a. Towel
 b. Dish
 c. Bum
6. Scissors
 a. Paper
7. Screwdriver
 a. Vodka
 b. Orange Juice
8. Blueprint
 a. House
9. Hinge
 a. Gate
Clothing
1. Shirt
 a. Shorts
2. Cane
 a. Crutch
 b. Walker
3. Purse
 a. Money
 b. Wallet
 c. Girl
4. Sweater
 a. Winter
5. Ring
 a. Marriage
6. Pants
 a. Man
7. Bracelet
 a. Wrist
8. Pajamas
 a. Bed
Furniture
1. Drapes
 a. Window
 b. House
 c. Wall
2. Desk
 a. Pen
 b. Clerk
 c. Paper
3. Ashtray
 a. Cigarette
 b. Smoke
 c. Car
4. Lamp
 a. Light
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Vehicles
1. Car
 a. Money
 b. Race
 c. Road
2. Jet
 a. Airline
3. Camel
 a. Desert
 b. Water
4. Yacht
 a. Ocean
 b. Sea
5. Train
 a. Track
 b. Station
6. Tractor
 a. Farm
 b. Grass
 c. Dirt
7. Bus
 a. People 
 b. City
 c. Station
8. Elevator
 a. Stair
 b. Building
 c. Box
9. Airplane
 a. Airport
 b. Movie
 c. Bird
Weapons
1. Knife
 a. Fork
 b. Spoon
2. Arrow
 a. Indian
 b. Target
3. Bomb
 a. War
 b. Death
4. Brick
 a. Wood
5. Shoe
 a. Sock
6. Axe
 a. Tree
 b. Saw
7. Sword
 a. Sheath
 b. Shield
8. Screwdriver
 a. Screw
 b. Vodka
 c. Wrench
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Experiment 3
Furniture
1. Sofa
 a. Sleep
 b. Sex
 c. Rest
2. Couch
 a. Potato
3. Table 
 a. Cloth
 b. Setting
4. Desk 
 a. Work
 b. Paper
 c. Pen
5. Bureau
 a. Investigation
 b. Government
 c. Organization
6. Chest
 a. Muscle
 b. Breast
 c. Heart
7. Vanity
 a. Beauty
 b. Pride
 c. Singer
8. Lounge
 a. Beer
 b. Drink
 c. Liquor
9. Cabinet
 a. Plate
 b. Book
10. Bench 
 a. Baseball
 b. Basketball
 c. Football
11. Stool
 a. Feces
 b. Foot
 c. Sample
12. Drawer
 a. Clothes
13. Piano
 a. Music
 b. Organ
 c. Guitar
14. Cushion
 a. Pin
15. Cupboard
 a. Cup
 b. Dishes
 c. Food
16. Stereo
 a. Radio
 b. CD
 c. Cassette
17. Mirror 
 a. Reflection
18. Television
 a. Commercial
 b. Movie
 c. Video
19. Bar
 a. Drink
 b. Alcohol
 c. Grill
20. Shelf
 a. Awards
 b. Life
 c. Room
21. Rug
 a. Carpet
 b. Floor
 c. Mat
22. Pillow
 a. Head
 b. Blanket
 c. Sheet
23. Radio
 a. Tape
24. Counter
 a. Sink
 b. Clerk
25. Drape
 a. Window
 b. House
 c. Wall
26. Refrigerator
 a. Microwave
27. Closet
 a. Hanger
28. Vase
 a. Flower
 b. Rose
 c. Plant
29. Ashtray
 a. Cigarette
 b. Ash 
 c. Car
30. Fan
 a. Air
31. Telephone
 a. Answering machine
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Experiment 3
Vehicles
1. Truck
 a. Road
 b. Truck stop
2. Car
 a. Money
 b. Race
3. Bus
 a. Bus stop
 b. City
 c. Station
4. Jeep
 a. Army
 b. Mud
5. Ambulance
 a. Hospital
6. Motorcycle
 a. Helmet
 b. Mouse
7. Van
 a. Hippie
 b. Family
8. Train
 a. Track
9. Bicycle
 a. Shop
10. Carriage
 a. House
11. Airplane
 a. Airport
 b. Bird
 c. Movie
12. Bike
 a. Rack
 b. Lock
 c. Trail
13. Boat
 a. Water
 b. Ocean
 c. Fish
14. Ship
 a. Sea
 b. Yard
15. Tractor
 a. Farm
 b. Grass
 c. Dirt
16. Wagon
 a. Cowboy
17. Subway
 a. Token
18. Trailer
 a. Park
19. Cart
 a. Groceries
 b. Basket
 c. Supermarket
20. Yacht
 a. Club
21. Tank
 a. Gas
22. Tricycle
 a. Children
 b. Baby
23. Canoe
 a. Indian
 b. River
24. Raft
 a. Lake
 b. Pool
 c. Beach
25. Submarine
 a. Sandwich
 b. Navy
26. Horse
 a. Cow
 b. Shit
 c. Dog
27. Rocket
 a. Space
 b. Moon
 c. Sky
28. Skates
 a. Ice
 b. Rink
 c. Rat
29. Camel
 a. Desert
 b. Cigarette
 c. Egypt
30. Feet
 a. Shoes
 b. Hands
 c. Inch
31. Skis
 a. Snow
 b. Mountain
 c. Resort
32. Elevator
 a. Stair
 b. Escalator
 c. Building
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APPENDIX F 
RESULTS FROM EXPERIMENTS
Experiment 1
Table F1. 
Category Inclusion Rates by Politics and Mode for Female Participants
Group High Medium Atypical Non-category
Liberal
  Approach .83(.04) .84(.04) .68(.04) .18(.03)
  Neutral .83(.03) .84(.04) .74(.04) .19(.03)
  Avoidance .88(.03) .90(.03) .77(.03) .21(.02)
Conservative
  Approach .75(.04) .74(.04) .66(.04) .18(.03)
  Neutral .86(.04) .87(.04) .74(.04) .26(.03)
  Avoidance .87(.05) .87(.05) .73(.06) .12(.04)
Table F2. 
Category Inclusion Rates by Politics and Mode for Male Participants
Group High Medium Atypical Non-category
Liberal
  Approach .86(.06) .92(.06) .82(.06) .21(.05)
  Neutral .92(.07) .92(.07) .65(.77) .10(.06)
  Avoidance .91(.06) .94(.06) .81(.06) .23(.05)
Conservative
  Approach .91(.06) .87(.06) .72(.06) .20(.05)
  Neutral .97(.06) .99(.06) .71(.07) .16(.05)
  Avoidance .89(.06) .91(.06) .74(.07) .20(.05)
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Experiment 2
Table F5. 
Best Fitting Parameters and AIC Values for Clothing
 c wrange  γ AIC 
Constrained 31.63 0.80 4.26 87.79 
c     
  Liberals 31.12 
  Conservatives 32.06 0.80 4.26 89.63 
  Approach 31.88 
  Avoidance 31.43 
0.80 4.26 89.76 
  Conservative      
  Avoidance 34.90 
  Others 30.55 
0.80 4.22 87.64 
wvar     
  Liberal 0.81 
  Conservative 31.78 0.80 4.26 93.12 
  Approach 0.78 
  Avoidance 
32.13 
0.81 
4.26 91.32 
  Conservative  
  Avoidance 0.69 
  Others 
31.79 
0.81 
4.14 92.05 
γ     
  Liberal 4.19 
  Conservative 31.63 0.80 4.33 89.72 
  Approach 5.06 
  Avoidance 
31.08 0.80 
4.03 
86.85 
  Conservative  
  Avoidance 
4.31 
 
  Others 
31.67 0.80 
4.23 
89.76 
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Table F6. 
Best Fitting Parameters and AIC Values for Furniture
 c wrange γ AIC 
Constrained 19.25 0.46 3.90 215.31 
c     
  Liberals 20.23 
  Conservatives 18.59 0.51 4.10 216.19 
  Approach 21.10 
  Avoidance 21.59 
0.53 3.63 225.93 
  Conservative      
  Avoidance 18.94 
  Others 19.94 
0.44 3.94 222.99 
wvar     
  Liberal 0.45 
  Conservative 23.38 0.52 3.43 243.41 
  Approach 0.63 
  Avoidance 
18.07 
0.31 
4.36 241.91 
  Conservative  
  Avoidance 0.44 
  Others 
19.82 
0.47 
3.74 241.22 
γ     
  Liberal 4.33 
  Conservative 20.14 0.51 3.58 215.01 
  Approach 3.99 
  Avoidance 
17.72 0.39 
4.41 
218.24 
  Conservative  
  Avoidance 4.49 
  Others 
17.82 0.38 
4.07 
227.39 
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Table F7. 
Best Fitting Parameters and AIC Values for Vehicles
 c wrange γ AIC 
Constrained 6.33 0.60 11.98 311.92 
c     
  Liberals 6.81 
  Conservatives 6.39 0.62 12.07 314.96 
  Approach 6.94 
  Avoidance 6.32 
0.61 11.77 314.35 
  Conservative      
  Avoidance 5.92 
  Others 6.59 
0.60 12.18 317.20 
wvar     
  Liberal 0.61 
  Conservative 6.63 0.63 11.73 333.42 
  Approach 0.63 
  Avoidance 
7.96 
0.57 
9.27 334.46 
  Conservative  
  Avoidance 0.68 
  Others 
6.48 
0.51 
11.08 335.12 
γ     
  Liberal 11.82 
  Conservative 6.91 0.59 10.25 315.06 
  Approach 11.78 
  Avoidance 
6.87 0.60 
10.42 
316.57 
  Conservative  
  Avoidance 9.97 
  Others 
8.05 0.52 
8.05 
304.95 
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Table F10. 
Best Fitting Parameters and WSSD Values for Furniture
 c wrange A B α k µ WSSD 
Constrained 52.58 0.56 1.03 1.76 44.58 13.09 2.04 50.93 
c         
  Liberals 44.94 
  Conservatives 38.31 0.48 1.40 2.71 0.78 144.4 437.40 49.98 
  Approach 58.91 
  Avoidance 57.10 
0.77 1.02 1.77 25.95 22.13 12.77 54.73 
  Conservative 
  Avoidance 53.33 
  Others 61.59 
0.79 1.00 1.63 133.19 4.98 3.18 48.95 
  Liberals 
  Approach 54.71 
  Others 48.95 
0.75 1.00 1.74 39.68 15.10 5.53 53.18 
w         
  Liberal 0.78 
  Conservative 48.25 0.70 1.01 1.76 256.63 2.33 7.12 48.50 
  Approach 0.84 
  Avoidance 
51.63 
0.50 
1.08 1.85 31.65 17.09 2.25 52.15 
  Conservative 
  Avoidance 0.52 
  Others 
44.44 
0.76 
1.03 1.83 108.80 5.11 16.11 49.07 
  Liberals 
  Approach 50.88 0.58 1.03 1.77 65.79 8.91 3.62 51.78 
Liberals 
  Approach 50.88 0.58 
  Others  0.65 
1.03 1.77 65.79 8.91 3.62 51.78 
A         
  Liberal 1.08 
  Conservative 44.21 0.74 1.07 1.86 8.09 59.46 91.84 53.95 
  Approach 1.03 
  Avoidance 
44.28 0.62 
1.04 
1.84 2.76 154.62 61.95 50.49 
  Conservative  
  Avoidance 0.94 
  Others 
51.17 0.67 
1.04 
1.73 39.56 15.19 7.41 48.35 
  Liberals 
  Approach 0.93 
  Others 
53.87 0.62 
1.02 
1.71 40.78 14.84 15.12 51.10 
B         
  Liberal 1.54 
  Conservative 73.63 0.90 0.94 1.64 98.21 6.96 0.58 52.61 
  Approach 1.80 
  Avoidance 
53.76 0.56 1.08 
1.75 
6.12 87.82 -22.83 52.75 
  Conservative 
  Avoidance 1.54 
  Others 
55.66 0.67 0.96 
1.67 
204.15 3.26 3.88 54.76 
  Liberals 
  Approach 1.79 
  Others 
42.65 0.65 1.05 
1.89 
96.12 5.69 6.02 51.89 
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Table F10 continued.
 
 c wrange A B α k µ WSSD 
A & B         
  Liberal 0.99 1.79 
  Conservative 55.54 0.72 1.03 1.77 101.27 6.38 2.23 51.81 
  Approach 0.96 1.68 
  Avoidance 
64.70 0.74 
0.97 1.62 
137.66 4.30 0.39 48.56 
  Conservative 
  Avoidance 1.05 1.89 
  Others 
39.05 0.65 
1.13 1.97 
3.09 131.82 78.74 49.52 
  Liberals 
  Approach 0.91 1.90 
  Others 
49.05 0.59 
1.07 1.72 
29.99 19.48 -0.07 110.50 
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Table F11. 
Best Fitting Parameters and WSSD Values for Vehicles
 
 
 
 c wrange A B α k µ WSSD 
Constrained 3.75 0.43 28.59 38.10 1.82 0.56 -24.50 658.45 
c         
  Liberals 2.18 
  Conservatives 2.11 0.52 56.12 45.43 4.63 0.09 2.36 579.98 
  Approach 3.63 
  Avoidance 3.81 
0.49 23.96 32.83 1.98 0.70 2.24 490.49 
  Conservative 
  Avoidance 3.68 
  Others 3.34 
0.50 28.13 33.16 6.72 0.17 1.63 548.00 
  Liberals 
  Approach 2.95 
  Others 2.75 
0.54 34.97 36.17 2.47 0.35 -2.15 397.11 
w         
  Liberal 0.54 
  Conservative 3.49 0.52 23.80 28.94 5.72 0.28 -14.51 547.67 
  Approach 0.53 
  Avoidance 
3.64 
0.50 
23.92 28.18 15.58 0.10 -3.52 459.08 
  Conservative 
  Avoidance 0.41 
  Others 
2.80 
0.54 
38.30 39.90 8.93 0.81 2.88 574.15 
  Liberals 
  Approach 0.55 
  Others 
3.15 
0.51 
26.48 31.16 3.31 0.40 -7.30 544.40 
A         
  Liberal 31.94 
  Conservative 3.20 0.49 31.30 33.79 3.65 0.24 101.04 505.58 
  Approach 170.86 
  Avoidance 
1.52 0.54 
153.72 
57.31 7.49 0.01 416.96 734.00 
  Conservative 
  Avoidance 28.79 
  Others 
3.77 0.40 
32.66 
34.00 21.39 0.05 -5.79 512.16 
  Liberals 
  Approach 22.65 
  Others 
3.55 0.52 
25.19 
29.56 0.66 2.20 -5.45 549.09 
B         
  Liberal 25.31 
  Conservative 5.01 0.41 20.36 24.42 8.12 0.27 -9.62 472.20 
  Approach 28.95 
  Avoidance 
4.46 0.49 19.61 
25.27 
34.74 0.06 -20.81 468.76 
  Conservative 
  Avoidance 27.44 
  Others 
4.12 0.44 23.20 
31.57 
14.48 0.11 -5.35 404.35 
  Liberals 
  Approach 34.78 
  Others 
3.23 0.51 27.94 
32.71 
2.25 0.52 -9.83 440.99 
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Table F11 continued.
 
  c wrange A B α k µ WSSD 
A & B         
  Liberal 21.44 32.05 
  Conservative 4.10 0.44 23.09 29.51 2.35 0.68 -12.27 363.17 
  Approach 22.45 39.22 
  Avoidance 
3.69 0.49 
23.29 32.77 
4.67 0.29 -1.50 396.18 
  Conservative 
  Avoidance 20.12 28.06 
  Others 
3.99 0.49 
22.85 28.04 
3.30 0.54 -2.62 381.26 
  Liberals 
  Approach 23.43 34.96 
  Others 
3.77 0.48 
26.04 31.20 
4.68 0.29 -2.05 463.80 
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